University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

2017

Bankruptcy Beyond Status Maintenance
Govind Persad
University of Denver, gpersad@law.du.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Law and Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Govind Persad, Bankruptcy Beyond Satus Maintenance, 11 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 451 (2017).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

Bankruptcy Beyond Status Maintenance
Publication Statement
Originally published as Govind Persad, Bankruptcy Beyond Satus Maintenance, 11 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 451
(2017).
Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

This article is available at Digital Commons @ DU: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub/230

VIRGINIA LAW & BUSINESS REVIEW
VOLUME 11

SPRING 2017

NUMBER 3

BANKRUPTCY BEYOND STATUS MAINTENANCE
Govind Persadt
ABSTRACT

This Artice examines the tendeng of current American bankrupty
lax to maintain the social and economic status of middle- and upperclass debtors while doing much less to assist poorer debtors and nondebtors. In doing so, it examines and categodies va'ous aspects of
statutoy and case lay) that allon' debtors to preserve theirprioreconomic
status. After reconstructing and rebutting the normative arguments
offered in defense of these provisions, it suggests a proposalforreforming
bankrupty lay to emphasiZe goals other than the maintenance of
economic status.
Part I of the Article begins by descrbing ways in which current
bankrupty lay serves to help debtors retain theirpre-bankrupty social
and economic status, n'ith a focus on exemptionsfrom the bankrupty
estate. Part II then critically evaluates two types of arguments that
defend the goal of helping debtors retain theirprior social and economic
status: one appeals to debtors' claims, while the other appeals to soietal
interests. PartIII proposes reorienting bankrupty law awap from the
preservation of debtors'_paststatus and toward three interlocking goals:
economic adequagfor debtors, economicfreedom for debtors, and equal
treatmentfor debtors and non-debtors. It also proposes some n'ays that
this reorientationmzght be achieved.
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INTRODUCTION

A

N ordinary person declaring bankruptcy will almost certainly at some
point come across the United States Courts' primer on bankruptcy law,
entitled Bankruptg Basics. This primer advises the reader that "[a] fundamental
goal of the federal bankruptcy laws enacted by Congress is to give debtors a
financial 'fresh start' from burdensome debts."' In support of this assertion,
1

ADMIN.

OFFICE OF THE U.S.

COURTS,

BANKRUPTCY

BASICS
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the primer describes bankruptcy law using the following language from a
1934 Supreme Court decision, LocalLoan Co. v. Hunt "[iMt gives to the honest
but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt."

2

This Article focuses on what the ellipsis above conceals: the requirement
that the debtor be not only honest and unfortunate, but also "surrenderH for
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy .. . ."3 Just
as the debtor's "clear field for future effort" is one unmarred by prior
obligations, this language makes it clear that it should be equally unbeautified
by prior assets. Yet the elision of this requirement is not unique to a single
primer for lay debtors.
Many judges and scholars explicitly describe
bankruptcy as helping debtors to preserve what they have, rather than
enabling them to start over anew. My goal in this Article is to criticize this
status-preservation model of bankruptcy law, and to advocate instead for a
model in which debtors' field for future endeavors is clear of past assets as
well as past debts. Such a clear-field model of bankruptcy law is more
normatively attractive and truer to the text and purpose of bankruptcy law.
In Part I of this Article, I begin by describing ways in which current
bankruptcy law serves to help debtors retain their pre-bankruptcy economic
status, with a focus on exemptions from the bankruptcy estate. Part II
critically evaluates two arguments in favor of helping debtors to retain their
prior status: one appeals to debtors' claims, while the other appeals to societal
interests. Part III proposes reorienting bankruptcy law away from the
preservation of debtors' past economic status and toward three interlocking
goals: adequacy for debtors, freedom for debtors, and equal treatment for
debtors and non-debtors. It also proposes some ways that this reorientation
might be achieved.
I. EXEMPTIONS AS STATUS MAINTENANCE

In one of her early articles, now-Senator Elizabeth Warren eloquently
embraces an understanding of bankruptcy law as maintaining debtors' status:
With adequate exemptions in place, the bankruptcy statutes
permit the working poor who have become hopelessly mired

2

3

http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17762/.
Id. (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
Loca/Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
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in consumer debt to begin again the climb into the middle
class with some assets intact.
The current bankruptcy
point
of social adjustment
statutes implicitly recognize that
and decree thatpart of the fresh start is some preservation of current
status when the debtor enters bankruptcy. Without adequate
exemptions, the bankruptcy statutes protect only future
income; each bankrupt debtor starts at an economic zeropoint with no assets. Of course, reasonable people may
disagree on how much status should be preserved ... .4
As Warren's own language suggests, what she envisions is less a
completely fresh start than a partially preserved one. Yet, despite the oddity
of juxtaposing the fresh start with status preservation, numerous bankruptcy
decisions embrace a similar juxtaposition, describing the fresh start as a way
of continuing the debtor's previous lifestyle. 5 To use a virtual rather than a
real-world parallel, Warren would make bankruptcy law analogous to the
"save points" provided in some computer games, which permit players who
fail in a task to start over, losing only part of what they have accomplished
rather than having to start afresh. 6
However, the fact that a "save point" approach primarily benefits
debtors who previously earned high incomes or acquired substantial property,
while those with few assets-whether debtors or non-debtors-receive no
parallel assistance, raises concerns that the game is rigged to help the rich stay
rich and the poor stay poor. As bankruptcy scholar William Vukowich wrote
three years before Warren:
Another general defect of exemption laws is that they
tend to perpetuate our economic class structure. Those who
have are allowed to keep; those who do not are given
nothing. This class perpetuation is most vivid when courts
4
s

Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptg Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J.
1333, 1356 (1983) (emphasis added).
E.g., Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 802 n.7 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Debtors
can reclaim items helpful to their fresh start after bankruptcy. . . ."); f Middleton v.
Farmers State Bank of Fosston, 45 BR. 744, 747 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ("A fresh start
should be a genuine new beginning for any debtor. It should permit him to continue his
chosen profession or trade . . . .").

6

See Lucille M. Ponte, Leveing up to Immersive Dispute Resolution (lDR) in 3-D Virtual Worlds:
Learning and Employing Key IDR Skills to Resolve In-World Developer-ParticantConflicts, 34 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 713, 723 n.59 (2012) (describing game in which "you can save
the game and start back at the save point when you fail").
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and commentators urge an application of the exemption laws
that allows a debtor to "maintain a standard of living
reasonably consistent with his occupation and previous
history." 7

The point that bankruptcy law frequently protects the wealthy more than
the poor has been made by more recent commentators advocating stricter
limits on relief for debtors, 8 as well as by those defending the current system.9
This point has also recently been made by one advocate for debtors, who
notes that:
[E]xemption law obviously favors the rich and the middleclass because it allows people to keep a large percentage of
what they have acquired in terms of property, reinforcing the
status quo. On the other hand, if one is poor and has not
acquired many assets, then the exemptions scheme also
maintains the status quo. They still have nothing.10
7

9

to

William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rzghts Under the Bankruptg Reform Act, 58 N.C. L.
REV. 769, 770 (1980) (quoting DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 206 (1971)); see also Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a
"Philosophy of Bankruptg," 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 473 n.199 (1973) ("The homestead
exemptions and those for life insurance favor a more affluent group as measured by net
worth (which is itself largely a function of differences in disposable income over time).").
Eg., Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankrupty Crisis, 99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1463, 1533 n.267 (2005) ("[M]iddle-class families will be more likely to have the type
of property that can be protected through bankruptcy exemptions, such as houses, cars,
and retirement plans."); Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptg Law as Sodal Legislation, 5 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 393, 421 (2001) ("Because of the structure of exemption laws and the type of
property that a debtor can protect in bankruptcy, the financial benefits of bankruptcy,
relative to one's income and assets, generally rise as a debtor's income and wealth rise....
Most exemptions in bankruptcy are tied to specific types of property, such as a house or
car. Almost by definition, wealthier individuals are likely to have more (and more
valuable) of the types of property protected by exemptions."); Brian Rothschild, Note, The
Ilogic of No Limits on Bankruptg, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV.J. 473, 492 (2007) ("[B]ankruptcy
distributes more to those who have or have recently had higher income than to those who
have lower or no income.").
See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Non-ProcrusteanBankruptg, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 304 (2004)
(hereinafter Hynes, Non-ProcrusteanBankruptg) ("Because these laws protect the debtor's
income and assets, they sometimes allow wealthy or upper-income debtors to continue a
comfortable lifestyle, while offering little help for the truly poor who lack anything
significant to protect."); Richard M. Hynes, Whj (Consumer) Bankruptg?, 56 ALA. L. REV.
121, 128-29 (2004) [hereinafter Hynes, Whj (Consumer) Bankruptgi] ("T]he bankruptcy
exemptions are typically generous relative to the actual assets of most Americans, to say
nothing of most Americans in financial distress.").
Nathalie Martin, Poverty, Culture and the Bankruptg Code: Narrativesfrom the Money Law Cnic,

Virginia Law & Business Review
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In the remainder of this Part, I will review several provisions of
bankruptcy law that assist debtors in preserving their pre-bankruptcy
economic status. These provisions generally take the form of exemptions
that exclude some portion of a debtor's assets or income from the resources
available to creditors.
A. Income and Personal Property
Decision makers considering whether and to what extent debtors should
be able to retain their pre-bankruptcy economic positions have approached
the question in three ways:
1)
2)

3)

The first category consciously aims to maintain debtors' prebankruptcy lifestyle. I call these expicit status-preservationapproaches.
The second category, reasonableness approaches, employs case-by-case
discretion to determine whether a debtor's post-bankruptcy
economic position is reasonable. In practice, this approach also
frequently maintains debtors' positions above those of many nondebtors.
The third category, universalapproaches, compares a debtor's economic
position to some externally provided, universal yardstick-such as
the poverty line or guidelines promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service. While universal approaches are closest to the clear-field
model of bankruptcy, many remain much more generous to debtors
than to equally poor non-debtors.
1. Expicit Status-PreservationApproaches

Some courts have explicitly sought to protect debtors' pre-bankruptcy
social and economic position. California courts have taken the position that
the debtor's "station in life" and accustomed social position should be
considered when determining which possessions are unreachable by
creditors." Similar positions have been adopted in Kansas,1 2 as well as

11

12 CLINICAL L. REv. 203, 232 (2005).
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Nolan, 931 F.2d 897, at *1 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table
decision) ("California courts place substantial emphasis on a debtor's station in life and
accustomed manner of living in deciding exemption claims."); In re Lucas, 62 B.R. 949,

952-53 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 77 B.R. 242 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (exempting
valuable figurines on the basis that they are appropriate furnishings given debtors' station

in life); see also Newport Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 1046 (Cal. Ct. App.
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Texas.' 3 These state court decisions have provided persuasive authority on
which courts construing similar language in federal bankruptcy law have
relied.14 Similarly, courts applying Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code have
concluded that "a court determining the debtor's disposable income is not
expected to, and should not, mandate drastic changes in the debtor's lifestyle
"15

The property exempted by these decisions is sometimes quite valuable.
One recent Kansas case allowed an exemption for a:

1969) ("[F]urniture is necessary if it is appropriate to the station in life of the judgment
debtor and the manner of comfortable living to which he has become accustomed . . . .");

Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) ("It is well
settled that in deciding whether furniture or wearing apparel is necessary and should be
exempted from execution the court will consider the station in life of the owner and the
manner of comfortable living to which he has become accustomed.").
12

See Walnut Valley State Bank of El Dorado v. Coots, 60 BR. 834, 837 (D. Kan. 1986)
("[D]ebtors' antiques, although not indispensable to the debtors' survival, were correctly
found to be household furnishings reasonably necessary to maintain the debtors'

customary standard of living . . . .") (applying Kansas law); In re Chadwick, 113 B.R. 540,
542 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (applying Kansas law and describing Kansas exemption as
encompassing "all items of household furnishings reasonably necessary for continuation

of the debtor's life style"), abrogated bj In re Peet, No. 15-2040, 2016 WL 1659969 (8th Cir.
Apr. 27, 2016); Nohinek v. Logsdon, 628 P.2d 257, 259 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that exemption depends on whether "property is reasonable and necessary to the debtor's
customary standard of living").

13

Fernandez v. Siedler (In re Fernandez), 855 F.2d 218, 222 n.24 (5th Cir. 1988) (observing
that the "station in life of the person claiming the exemption" has been employed as a

criterion by Texas courts) (quoting In re Tyler, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1537, 1538 (N.D.
Tex. 1976)); In re Rowe, No. 284-20097, 1985 WL 1263665, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar.
14, 1985) (interpreting bankruptcy exemptions to "permit consideration of the particular
debtor's station in life and manner of living to which he or she had become accustomed in
making the 'fresh start' analysis" and noting that "[t]he debtors in this case are
professional persons who enjoyed a standard of living above the norm until fate

intervened"). But see In re Leva, 96 B.R. 723, 732-33 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (rejecting
the relevance of debtors' "station in life" to exemptions, and arguing that "[t]he Fifth
Circuit seems to have acknowledged in FernandeZ that station in life is a suspect variable").
14

See Coleman v. Lake Air Bank (In re Coleman), 5 B.R. 76, 78 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980)
("In determining whether specific items are exempted as necessary household furnishings,
state courts have given consideration to the particular debtor's station in life and the
manner of living to which he or she had become accustomed."); see also Peter C.

Alexander, With Apologies to CS. Lewis: An Essa on Discharge and Forgiveness, 9 J.
& PRAC. 601, 605-06 ("Under the 1841 Act, a debtor was
and to retain the family's clothing, household and kitchen
judged necessary by the assignee of the debtor's estate with
the family, condition, and circumstance' of the debtor, not to
15

BANKR.

L.

permitted to file bankruptcy
furniture and other articles
'reference in the amount to
exceed $300.").

In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 355 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); f In re Sandercock, No. 0336260F, 2005 WL 6522759, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2005) ("Nor would purchase
of a less expensive vehicle have involved a serious diminution of the debtors' lifestyle.").
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"Hollywood stage setting," which contains life sized
dioramas of an old Sinclair gas station, a highway caf6, and a
Ford garage. From the Court's review of the photographs,
these settings are enhanced by the presence of signage (some
neon) advertising various automotive services, parts, gas, and
the like. The Sinclair gas station portion of the barn contains
a gas pump island with antique gas pumps, an air
pump/hose, tires, and other objects. Also depicted in the
exhibits are the caf6 with neon signage, various car parts or
automotive-related items displayed or stored, and many
pictures and signs hung on the walls.16
Similarly, one of the California cases involved an exemption for:
[P]ieces of wooden furniture sufficient for all the rooms in
the apartment, 2 sets of china, plates, dishes, wine glasses,
highball glasses, juice glasses, cordial glasses, beer mugs,
water goblets, service plates, salad plates, soup dishes, sauce
dishes, cups and saucers, vases, platters, trays, bowls, knives,
forks, ash trays and miscellaneous pieces of the same general
order. All the wooden pieces were of heavy construction,
many of them elaborately carved; most of the tables were
marble-topped.17
Many of the cases that exempt personal property on the basis of
individuals' customary standard of living reference an individual debtor's
subjective psychological and personal attachment. The Kansas debtor with
the elaborately decorated barn conceded that the dioramas in the barn "were
not 'necessary' per se, but are a part of 'who he is."'"8 Similarly, a California
court found it relevant that the debtor was "the son of wealthy parents, was
reared and had lived in an atmosphere of affluence and elegance which he has
maintained in the furnishing of his apartment" and that "he had furnished his
apartment in a manner to which he had been long accustomed." 9 Another
California court similarly justified granting exemptions by referencing the
debtor's past economic position:

16
17

18
19

In re Lejuerrne, No. 02-14863, 2004 WL 2192515, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. July 9, 2004).
Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
In re Leuernme, 2004 WL 2192515, at *2.
Heler, 275 Cal. App. at 87-88.
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Mr. Lucas has been a plumber for eight years. Mrs. Lucas
has worked in accounting at Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Corporation for five years. The Debtors' aggregate 1984
income exceeded $32,000.
This record of steady
employment and level of income supports a finding that the
Debtors' ownership of the six figurines, worth $1,200, was
appropriate . . . .20
The individualized nature of these assessments calls into doubt their
characterization as an "objective test" for when an exemption should be
provided.
Other state courts, however, have explicitly rejected the use of
bankruptcy law to help debtors maintain their pre-bankruptcy lifestyle:
The statute expressly makes distinctions in the exemption of
property from execution, based upon the occupation or
calling of the debtor, but, beyond such express provisions,
there can be no distinction, based upon the previous
financial or social position of the insolvent debtor; otherwise
the statute would operate unequally between the rich and the
poor.... The previous financial condition and social station
of the debtor may properly be considered in determining
whether the article sought to be exempted was acquired in
good faith, for the purpose for which exemption is claimed,
or for the purpose of defrauding creditors in contemplation
of insolvency, but beyond this it is not perceived that they
are material factors. 21
In the same case, the court later explicitly states that "[t]he purpose of
exemption laws is to save debtors and their families from want, not to enable
them to wear luxurious ornaments at the expense of their creditors." 2 2

Although the court allows the consideration of a debtor's prior occupation,
20
21

22

In re Lucas, 62 B.R. 949, 952-53 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 77 B.R. 242 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1987).
Millington v. Herbert (In re Millington's Estate), 218 P. 1022, 1023-24 (Cal. Ct. App.
1923). Contra Heler, 275 Cal. App. 2d at 87 (citing Mington's Estate for the proposition
that "[i]t is well settled that in deciding whether furniture or wearing apparel is necessary
and should be exempted from execution the court will consider the station in life of the
owner and the manner of comfortable living to which he has become accustomed").
In reMi n0gtoni's Estate, 218 P. at 1025.
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and allows prior social and economic position to be relevant as evidence that
a debtor took on a debt in the ordinary course of events rather than with
intent to defraud, 23 it clearly rejects the relevance of accustomed social and
economic position to bankruptcy law. More recently, a Texas bankruptcy
court similarly rejected the consideration of a debtor's "station in life" when
determining whether personal property is exempt, on the basis that
considering a debtor's past lifestyle entrenches social stratification.24
Recent cases concerning federal bankruptcy exemptions have also denied
the relevance of accustomed lifestyle. Among the most prominent is Matter of
Taff a Connecticut bankruptcy court opinion holding that, when considering
how much of a retirement plan should be exempted under the Bankruptcy
Code, courts should ignore the debtor's "former status in society or the
lifestyle to which he is accustomed . . . ."25 Taffs interpretation of the
"reasonably necessary" language as excluding the maintenance of prior
lifestyles has also been applied to similar language in other sections of the
23

24

25

Cf Holber v. Jacobs (In rejacobs), 381 B.R. 147, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (concluding
that, because the debtor's "income level appears to be below the level necessary to
support the lifestyle to which it is likely he and his family were accustomed . . . [i]t is
natural to infer that the [sum at issue] was expended in the ordinary course on customary
personal living expenses in the one year period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case");
see also May Co. v. Stevenson (In re Stevenson), 9 B.R. 437, 438 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981)
(similar).
In re Leva, 96 B.R. at 732 ("I do not believe that a debtor's station in life should serve as
justification for treating a jewelry piece as exempt. . . . [Station in life] is really a
euphemism for a debtor's pre-bankruptcy economic and social class. Stratification of
debtors along such lines should be anathema to a court sitting in equity. . . . Exemption
laws set a base for all citizens, regardless of station in life. They do not assure the
preservation of one's pre-filing station in life, nor should they."); see also In re Mitchell, 103
B.R. 819, 823 n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) ("Our exemption laws .... do not assure the
preservation of a debtor's station in life.") (citing Leta, 96 B.R. at 728).
Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); see also Sheehan v.
Morehead (In re Morehead), 283 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing Taff as a
"leading case" and holding that "the fresh start guaranteed by bankruptcy, and supported
by the exemption scheme, does not entitle a debtor to maintain the lifestyle to which he
was accustomed in better times"); In re Kochell, 26 B.R. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982)
("[]he purpose of the exemptions is to protect the fresh start of the debtor following
bankruptcy, not to insure that no future misfortune could possibly lower the standard of
living to which the debtor's dependents have become accustomed."), affd, 31 B.R. 139
(W.D. Wis. 1983), affd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984). But see Joseph P. Corish & Michael
J. Herbert, The Debtor's Dilemma: Disposable Income as the Cost of Chapter 13 Discharge in
Consumer Bankruptg, 47 LA. L. REV. 47, 73 (1986) ("Taffsays that the debtor's prior lifestyle
is not relevant in determining the amount he has to pay creditors. This is not, in fact, an
accurate description of the cases, nor is it clear whether it is the appropriate rule. The
disposable income cases have permitted the debtor to continue something resembling his
prior lifestyle.").

11:3 (2017)
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Code. 26 The same position taken in Taff is advocated by the Uniform
Exemptions Act and by a leading treatise on bankruptcy law, and has been
adopted by many courts deciding bankruptcy cases. 27 Courts interpreting
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code have similarly concluded that debtors are
not entitled to maintain their pre-bankruptcy standard of living at the expense
of creditors. 28 A similar determination has also been made in an individual
Chapter 11 case. 29
2. Reasonableness Approaches
Especially before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts
deciding what income a Chapter 13 debtor may exempt from creditors' reach
frequently focused on the reasonableness of the debtor's planned postbankruptcy lifestyle.30 The same has been true for courts determining the
26

27

28

29

30

See, e.., In re Jones, 55 BR. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (applying the Taff
interpretation to Section 1325(b) of the Code).
See In re Guilkema, 329 BR. 607, 617-18 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (describing parallel
between Taff position and these scholarly positions); see also In re Morris, No. 12-31633,
2013 WL 2595936, at *9 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. June 11, 2013) (concluding that bankruptcy
exemptions are not "meant to secure for a debtor his former social status or his former
affluent lifestyle"); In re Williams, 181 B.R. 298, 302 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995) ("The
Bankruptcy Code does not define the phrase 'reasonably necessary.' That term is defined,
however, in the Uniform Exemptions Act, and the commentary indicates that the
'reasonably necessary' standard "does not focus on 'the debtor's station in life and the
standard of living to which he has been accustomed.' . . . Rather, the Act 'requires the
court to direct its attention to the individual's needs and responsibilities."').
In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. 782, 784 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) ("D]ebtors in Chapter 13 cases
are not entitled to maintain their former lifestyles and statuses in society at the expense of
their creditors."); see also Am. Express Centurion Bank v. McGilberry (In re McGilberry),
298 B.R. 258, 260 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2003) ("[M]odification of a debtor's lifestyle is often
the price to be paid for the privilege of obtaining a Chapter 13 discharge.").
In re Weber, 209 B.R. 793, 800 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) ("A debtor cannot file a Chapter 11
petition and claim an entitlement to live in the style to which he or she has become
accustomed.").
E.g., N.Y.C. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 243 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2001) ("It
is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court judge to make a decision, based on the
facts of each individual case, whether or not . . . pension contributions qualify as a
reasonably necessary expense for that debtor."); In re Woodman, 287 B.R. 589, 596
(Bankr. D. Me. 2003), affd, No. 02-20273-JBH, 2003 WL 23709465 (D. Me. Sept. 19,
2003), affd, 379 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[]he court, without the aid of arbitrary, bright
line formulae, must scrutinize the debtor's budget in view of the debtor's particular
circumstances, and use its best judgment to determine whether expenses other than those
that are 'reasonably necessary' have been improperly included in the disposable income
calculus."); In re Awuku, 248 B.R. 21, 29-30 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that the
standard for reasonably necessary expenses under Chapter 13 "could not be readily
reduced to tightly bound and mutually exclusive categories" and that "[w]hen approaching
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scope of exemptions in Chapter 7 bankruptcies, 3' and for courts determining
the slightly different "minimal standard of living" that a debtor seeking to
discharge student loans is permitted to maintain. 32
Some courts applying reasonableness approaches have permitted debtors
to retain expensive assets or spend freely. For instance, bankruptcy courts
have determined that spending $200-300 per month on cigarettes was
reasonable.33 Other courts, in contrast, have been quicker to reject expenses
as unreasonable: one court rejected a couple's spending $58 per month on
recreation and charitable contributions, 34 and another asserted that "it is
unreasonable for [a debtor] to spend money on internet access, when he
could obtain the same service for free at a public library." 35
Although reasonableness approaches have no explicit commitment to
helping debtors retain their pre-bankruptcy lifestyle, courts employing them
frequently grant extensive deference to the debtor's listed expenses, only
paring them back when they appear outrageous. These expenses, in turn,
frequently enable the debtors to continue aspects of their pre-bankruptcy
lifestyle, such as car and home ownership, forms of recreation, provision of

31
32

33

34
35

these questions of what is 'reasonably necessary,' bankruptcy judges must respond to the
'felt necessities' of their times.").
E.g., Hunter v. Hotchkiss (In re Hotchkiss), 93 BR. 546, 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)
("W]hat which is reasonably necessary must be determined on a case by case basis.").
See Miller v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Miller), 409 B.R. 299, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009)
(asserting that bankruptcy courts enjoy substantial discretion in determining what
constitutes a minimal standard of living); Avellano v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Avellano), No. 01-30885 TEC, 2009 WL 2779822, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 16, 2009)
('Minimal standard of living' does not mean a middle-class lifestyle, and contemplates
that the debtor can be required to make 'major personal and financial sacrifices,' but it
does not require the court rigidly to apply Internal Revenue Service standards or federal
poverty guidelines.
The court may consider such guidelines, but must make its
determination on the basis of the debtor's individual circumstances, taking account of all
actual expenses reasonably necessary to the maintenance of a minimal standard of living
by that debtor."); see also McCafferty v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re McCafferty), No. 1404545-FPC7, 2015 WL 6445185, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2015) (similar).
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Emps. Credit Union v. Collins, No. 10-14611, 2011 WL 2746210, at
*10 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011); Sarasota, Inc. v. Weaver, No. CIV.A. 04-1557, 2004 WL
2514290, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2004) ("Given Debtor's modest levels of discretionary
spending and the Bankruptcy Court's acceptance of Debtor's testimony regarding the cost
of her cigarette habit, this Court concludes that the bankruptcy court's finding that
$200.00 was reasonable and necessary is not clearly erroneous."); see also In re Woodman,
287 B.R. at 597 (similar).
U.S. Trustee v. Wray (In re Wray), 136 B.R. 122, 125 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
Southard v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Southard), 337 B.R. 416, 421 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2006).
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care to others, and charitable donations. 36 Such an approach is advocated by
Collier's influential treatise on bankruptcy:
A court determining the debtor's disposable income is not
expected to, and should not, mandate drastic changes in the
debtor's lifestyle to fit some preconceived norm for chapter
13 debtors. . . . [T]he court cannot and should not order
debtors to alter their lifestyles where there is no obvious
indulgence in luxuries, even where one or more unsecured
creditors demand such a change. To engage in such close
judgments and supervision would be to contravene the
intent of Congress. It would also place impossible burdens
on the court in determining the absolute necessity of every
expense in each debtor's budget.37
Even though the treatise does not explicitly endorse status preservation
as a goal of bankruptcy law, its rejection of "drastic changes" or asking
debtors to "alter their lifestyle" clearly creates a presumption in favor of
debtors' pre-bankruptcy lifestyles.38
Several courts have adopted this
39
approach. Such courts will be more amenable to letting formerly wealthy or
36

37

38

39

Eg., In re McCafferty, 2015 WL 6445185, at *6 ("[]he McCaffertys are deeply religious
with a long history of monthly tithing. Therefore, tithing expenses up to $150 per month
would be reasonable.").
In re Stein, 91 B.R. 796, 801-02 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (quoting 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY T 1325.08[4][b], at 1325-48 to -49 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed.
1988)); accord Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the ndvidual Debtor: The Case for
Narrow Consmuction of the Consumer Credt Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 151 (1986)
("Abuse in the context of Chapter 13 cases occurs not when a debtor lives extravagantly
in the eyes of the court, the creditors, or some fixed standard for how much individuals
should spend, but when, by an objective standard, the debtor is living above her means
within the framework of her existing standardof lbing.") (emphasis added).
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Savage (In re Savage), 311 B.R. 835, 841 n.7 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2004) ("[A] debtor is generally not required to alter reasonable lifestyle choices."); In re
Anderson, 143 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992) ("A high income debtor making
substantial payments under the plan may retain a greater dollar amount for discretionary
expense than could a debtor of modest income who proposes to make no payments to
unsecured creditors under the plan.").
Eg., Turner v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 318 B.R. 907, 919 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005)
("Although the Court is concerned about the Debtor's financial condition, the Court will
not dictate the Debtor's lifestyle, nor pass judgment on how the Debtor lives."); In re
Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 355 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ("'[T]he scope of my review of the
debtors' living expenses is narrow'. . . . [The Bankruptcy Code] should not be considered a
mandate for a court to superimpose its values and substitute its judgment for those of the
debtor on basic choices about appropriate maintenance and support."); see also In re
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high-income debtors retain expensive property or continue past patterns of
spending than to letting formerly poor debtors adopt an equally expensive
lifestyle in bankruptcy.
3. UniversaistApproaches
Many have criticized reasonableness approaches as time-intensive and
unpredictable. 40 These concerns have prompted the development, in several
areas of bankruptcy law, of universal yardsticks that apply to all debtors.
a. The FederalExemption Standard
Federal law entitles some debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy to exempt an
enumerated list of assets from the reach of creditors, notably including:
*
*
*

*
*
*

Up to $23,675 in a residence or burial plot, of which up to $11,850
can instead be used for other property.
Up to $3,775 in a motor vehicle.
Up to $12,625 in "household furnishings, household goods, wearing
apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments
Up to $1,600 in jewelry.
Up to $1,250 in other property.
Up to $2,375 in tools of the trade. 41

Many states have opted out of the federal exemptions and instead
provide their own exemptions, which vary widely in quantity and form.42
While the federal exemptions do not explicitly maintain status, refer to
debtors' past station in life, or provide scope for discretionary judgments,
they still serve to help better-off debtors preserve their economic status. A
bankrupt debtor who is able to use all these exemptions can exempt more

40

41
42

Urquhart, No. 09-71058, 2009 WL 3785573, at *4 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2009)
(similar); f In re Kitson, 65 BR. 615, 618-19 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) ("There has been
considerable debate concerning the degree to which bankruptcy judges . . . should make
judgments that impose limits on a debtor's lifestyle.").
E.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 65 (2011) ("T]he pre-BAPCPA
practice of calculating debtors' reasonable expenses on a case-by-case basis . . . led to
varying and often inconsistent determinations.").
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)-(6) (2012).
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 16; see also Hynes, Wj (Consumer) Bankruptg?, supra
note 9, at 138-39.
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than $40,000 in assets. By comparison, the median net worth of families who
fell between the 25th and 49.9th net worth percentiles was only $31,300.43
The federal exemptions therefore leave debtors who were well-off prebankruptcy better off, post-bankruptcy, not only than poorer debtors but also
than many non-debtors.
b. The IRS Standard
A more mathematical approach compares a debtor's expenses to the
Internal Revenue Service's "standardized expense amounts for basic
necessities, which the IRS prepares to help calculate taxpayers' ability to pay
overdue taxes."44 This comparison has been used to determine whether a
debtor is eligible for a bankruptcy discharge under Chapter 7, and has also
been used to determine whether student loans may be discharged. 45 The IRS
guidelines list standardized housing, transportation, medical, and food costs
based on geographic location.
The IRS guidelines, in their current form, do not refer in any way to the
debtors' former status. However, as with the federal property exemptions,
they provide formerly wealthy or high-income debtors with a much more
generous standard of living than many non-debtors, and many debtors who
were never wealthy, enjoy. In so doing, they also offer a form of status
maintenance. In the past, the IRS expense formulas also allowed families that
were wealthier pre-bankruptcy to spend more money on food and clothing,
which commentators criticized for perpetuating social stratification.46

43
44
45
46

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., 2013 SCF CHARTBOOK 73 (2013),

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/Eles/BulletinCharts.pdf.
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 61; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(2)(A) (2012).
For a walk-through of the IRS Collection Financial Standards, see Ivory v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ. (In re Ivory), 269 B.R. 890, 906 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001).
Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankrupt Legislation Through the News Media, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1091, 1134 n.212 (2004) ("[]he means test partially relies on IRS guidelines to
determine expenses of bankrupt households, but the IRS guidelines let richer families
spend more money.. . . Thus, the default expense rules in the means test would let a highincome household of one spend more on food than a low-income family of four.");
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptg in the United States? 18 BANKR. DEV.
J. 1, 24 (2001) ("Consider the IRS Allowance for Food, Clothing, and Other Items,
which differentiates based on income. A debtor with a family of 4 with annual income of
$70,000 would be allotted almost $5,000 per year more (and thus $25,000 for the sixty
months of the means test calculation) for food and clothing than would a debtor with a
$50,000 income. Do wealthier people have to eat more?").
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c. The Poverty Line
Another universal threshold employed by bankruptcy courts is the federal
poverty line. Although this is now a minority view, some courts have adopted
a test for undue hardship that required debtors seeking the discharge of
student loans to show that their income after loan payments would fall below
a "subsistence or poverty" level.4 7 Other courts have interpreted the majority

approach to student loan discharge, which requires debtors to show that
paying off student loans would drop them below a "minimal standard of
living," to entitle debtors only to a poverty-line level of income.4 8 It is
important to note, however, that many courts have rejected the use of the
poverty line as a cutoff for student loan dischargeability.49
In contrast, courts considering asset exemptions have generally allowed
debtors to retain a portion of their pre-bankruptcy assets above the poverty
47

48

49

See Richard B. Keeton, Guaranteed to Work or It's Free!: The Evolution of Student Loan Discharge
in Bankruptg and the Ninth Crcuit's Ruing in Hedlund v. Educational Resources Institute
Inc., 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 77 n.89, 80 n.107 (2015) (describing the "subsistence or
poverty" approach and noting that it is now a minority view); see also Bethune v. Student
Loan Guar. Found. (In re Bethune), 165 B.R. 258, 259-60 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994)
(concluding that debtor would not be reduced to "subsistence or poverty" after paying
student loans); Erickson v. N.D. State Univ. (In re Erickson), 52 B.R. 154, 159 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1985) (similar); f Rutherford v. William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (In re
Rutherford), 317 B.R. 865, 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004) ("For convenience, some courts
have adopted the United States Department of Health and Human Services Poverty
Guidelines as the minimal standard of living for purposes of student loan dischargeability
questions. In doing so these courts recognize an annual income above or below that
standard as exceeding or falling below the minimal standard of living.").
E.g., Knox v. Sallie Mae (In re Knox), No. 0506951EE, 2007 WL 3332060, at *5 (Bankr.
S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2007) ("[S]everal courts have held that the minimal standard of living is
at or near the poverty level. . . . This Court finds that the federal poverty guideline is a
useful yardstick for determining what is a minimal standard of living."); see also In re
Mallinckrodt, 274 B.R. 560, 566 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("In analyzing the sufficiency of a
debtor's income, some courts have objectively compared it to the official poverty level.");
Cadle Co. v. Webb (In re Webb), 132 B.R. 199, 202 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (requiring
debtor seeking discharge of a student loan to "show that her financial resources will allow
her to live only at a poverty level standard for the foreseeable future if she is obligated to
repay the student loan"). But see Stewart-Johnson v. Sallie Mae Servicing (In re StewartJohnson), 319 B.R. 192, 197 n.4 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) ("The Court is aware that some
student loan discharge cases refer to federal poverty standards, but they cite no basis for
doing so.").
E.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Howe (In re Howe), 319 B.R. 886, 889 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2005) C'We have rejected a rule that a person must fall below the Poverty Guidelines to
discharge a student loan.") (citation omitted); Elmore v. Mass. Higher Educ. Assistance
Corp. (In re Elmore), 230 B.R. 22, 26 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (test for student loan
dischargeability "does not require a debtor to demonstrate that repayment of the loan
would cause him and his family to live at or below the poverty level").
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line.5 0 The same has been true for courts considering what proportion of a
Chapter 13 debtor's income is "reasonably necessary . . . for the maintenance
and support of the debtor or a dependent." 5 ' This is so even though
determining what disposable income a Chapter 13 debtor may retain and
determining what income a student loan debtor needs in order to avoid
"undue hardship" involve similar inquiries. 52
A universal approach that entitles all debtors only to the poverty line is
most effective at avoiding the preservation of debtors' prior status. However,
the poverty line itself is widely agreed to lack a compelling normative
foundation and to be insufficient to provide households with a decent
standard of living.53 As such, basing bankruptcy exemptions on the poverty
line may fail to provide debtors with economic adequacy. On the other hand,
given that many non-debtors find themselves in "deep poverty," far below
even the poverty line, 5 4 and that many social programs for non-debtors use
the poverty line as a threshold,55 using the poverty line has the virtue of

50

E.g., In re Patrick, 411 B.R. 659, 669 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (in assessing what portion of
a retirement account should be exempt, "[i]t is difficult to ascertain what standard should
be used to determine reasonable expenses"; yet, "the poverty level . .
is not a proper

5

guide").
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2012); see, e.g., In re Tibbs, 242 B.R. 511, 516 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1999) ("When examining disposable income, courts need not go so far as to require that
the debtor lower his expenses to the poverty level."); In re Zaleski, 216 B.R. 425, 431
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1997) ("Debtors need not be reduced to poverty . . . ."); In re Sitarz, 150

B.R. 710, 718 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) ("T]he debtor's allowable living expenses need not
be restricted to those that would maintain a 'poverty level' of existence."); f In re Sutliff,
79 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[I]t is safe to say only that the poverty level
was clearly not contemplated . . . .").

52

In re Sutkff 79 B.R. at 157. But see Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Savage (In re Savage), 311
B.R. 835, 840 n.7 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004) ("In undue hardship analysis, most courts employ
the same model as is used to determine 'disposable income' for Chapter 13 plan
confirmation purposes.... Although the problems are similar (ascertaining whether there
are sufficient resources to fund payments), the objects (disposable income for plan
confirmations vs. payment without undue hardship) differ. Under § 1325, a debtor is
generally not required to alter reasonable lifestyle choices. . . . Under § 523(a)(8), the
debtor's lifestyle (particularly expenses) is subjected to more rigid scrutiny.").

53

See Peter M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: An Empideal Sun ey and RhetodcalAnalysis of Child
Povery in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 5, 13-19 (1996) (reviewing criticisms of the
poverty guidelines); John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire A Lawjer but Not Indgent: How States
Use the FederalPovery Guidelnes to Deprive Defendants of Their Sixth Amendment Rzht to Counsel,

54

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1204-05 (2013) (similar).
See generaly KATHRYN EDIN & H. LuKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST
NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015).

ss

See Gross, supra note 53, at 1206-11 (listing programs that base eligibility on the poverty
level or some percentage thereof).

Virginia Law & Business Review

468

11:3 (2017)

treating debtors and non-debtors equally-even if equality means equal
deprivation. Part III will examine this trade-off.
B. Occupational Property
Many states, as well as federal law, allow a special exemption for property
that individuals use in their professions. Even courts that do not allow
debtors to preserve other aspects of their pre-bankruptcy status have
permitted them to preserve their status as members of a specific trade or
profession.5 6 As an example, one court suggested that:
A debtor's profession may affect the number of jewelry
items reasonably necessary to be retained. A court might
find, for example, that it is useful and appropriate for a real
estate broker to have four or five necklaces, while a nurse
might only need one simple chain.57
A Seventh Circuit decision describes an exemption statute as "designed to
allow family farmers to keep the minimum equipment necessary to work the
land." 5 8 Several other decisions justify occupational exemptions on the basis
that they help debtors "to continue in their chosen trade or profession,"
rather than as giving them a fresh start to pursue a range of occupations. 59
Preservation of occupational status is contrary to the fresh-start goals of
bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy can result from changes in the larger economy
that render debtors' traditional occupations and skills obsolete. Policymakers
describe encouraging workers in collapsing industries to retrain and build new
skills as an important objective of social policy. 60 Furthermore, many non56

In re Leva, 96 B.R. 723, 734 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) C"If the line may be drawn
anywhere, it is at the point where a debtor contends that he or she must maintain a certain
station in life in order to work in one's chosen profession.").

s7

Id. at 732 n. 13.

58

In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., In re Kolsch, 58 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (listing cases); England v. First
Nat'l Bank of Bonham (In re England), 22 B.R. 389, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding
that exemption covers "items which allow the debtor to conduct his trade or profession in
approximately the same manner after bankruptcy as he did before bankruptcy"); f Kreig
v. Fellows, 30 P. 994, 995 (Nev. 1892) ("The general policy of all exemption laws is that
the unfortunate debtor shall not be left without the means of supporting himself and his
family in the vocation usuaypursued bj him.") (emphasis added).
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-3b (2016) (providing for a job training coordinator who will
assist "workers in need of retraining due to the obsolescence of their skills"); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 74-5065(f) (West 2017) (discussing "retraining of employees of a restructuring

s9

60
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debtors have to change their career or profession during their lifetime in
response to unanticipated social and economic change. Yet, even as courts
discourage debtors from maintaining unsustainable habits of spending and
owning, 6 1 they subsidize debtors' choices to remain in occupations whose

earnings may be insufficient to support them. As one commentator has
noted, it would be preferable to allow debtors to use their exemption to fund
training for a new profession. 62
C. Homes
Federal law provides a substantial exemption specifically for homes, and
some states provide much larger or even unlimited homestead exemptions. 63
Some commentators have explicitly described and defended these exemptions
as preserving debtors' former status and accustomed lifestyle.
Other
commentators have criticized these exemptions, especially when unlimited in
size, as unfair. 64

61

62

63

64

industry who are likely to be displaced because of obsolete or inadequate job skills and
knowledge"); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:23-3.1 (2017) (describing workers who are "unlikely
to return to similar employment due to a substantial reduction in work opportunities in
the individual's job classification"); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. It. 12, § 920.0 (2017)
(discussing "projects that would lead to the development of innovative strategies to meet
the needs of dislocated workers" and noting that "[s]uch projects shall emphasize
retraining and include counseling and assessment components"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 50.04.075 (West 2016) (defining category of "dislocated workers" who are "unlikely to
return to employment in the individual's principal occupation or previous industry
because of a diminishing demand for their skills in that occupation or industry.").
See, e.g., In re Webb, 447 B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (debtors should not be
allowed to use "the bankruptcy process to perpetuate a lifestyle that caused them to
experience financial difficulties in the first place"); Shaw v. U.S. Bankr. Adm'r, 310 B.R.
538, 541 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (debtors' "insistence on making such large mortgage payments
manifests a desire to hold on to a certain station of life, a desire that seems to have caused
many of their problems in the first place"); In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151, 157 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Debtors should not be allowed to continue in the lifestyle that drove
them to file bankruptcy. . . .").
See Lowell P. Bottrell, Comfortable Beds, A Church Pew, A CemeteU Lot, One Hog, One Pig Six
Sheep, One Cow, A Yolk of Oxen or A Horse, and Your NotaU Seat Some Thoughts About
Exempions, 72 N.D. L. REV. 83, 95 (1996) ("If a debtor wishes to take up a new
profession, the debtor should not be penalized by that wish.").
Justin H. Dion et al., More Homestead Protecon and Pre&ctabiltyfor MassachusettsHomeowners?:
Examining the Exanded Coverage Under an Act Relative to the Estate of Homestead, 35 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 99, 124-28 (2013) (50-state survey of homestead protections).
E.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Negodaing Bankmpty Legislation Through the News Meda, 41 HOUS.
L. REV. 1091, 1129 (2004) (noting criticism of bankruptcy legislation because of "[b]ill
proponents' reluctance to cap state homestead exemptions, 'the single biggest scandal in
the consumer bankruptcy system').
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Homeowners' exemptions have frequently been defended explicitly on
the basis that they protect debtors against the disruption of their accustomed
lifestyle. 65 One bankruptcy decision exemplifies this position, asserting that
"a court ought not, for example, require that a long-term resident of a
suburban community move to the city where housing and other costs are less
expensive simply because it will increase the disposable income which can be
paid to unsecured creditors." 66 Yet this judge presumably would not be
willing to allow a debtor with equal net worth to move, at his creditors'
expense, from a cheaper urban area to the suburb where that "long-term
suburban resident" resides. As I will discuss in Part IIA, this sort of
reasoning reinforces social stratification by treating suburban homes as akin
to tides of nobility, which individuals should not lose even if they fall on hard
times, rather than as goods to be distributed according to earning power,
need, or some other more egalitarian criterion.
Some commentators have similarly suggested that debtors should be free
to devote up to a quarter of their net income, no matter how high that
income might be, to housing. 67 This approach would be status-maintaining,

6

66

67

Eg., In re LaHaye, No. 03-10068, 2003 WL 22764771, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 10,
2003) C'Homestead laws are intended to preserve the stability of society by protecting the
home-owning middle class."); see also Jonathan D. Colan, You Can't Take That Awa from
Me: The Sanctip of the Homestead ProperyRziht and Its Effect on Civil Forfeiture of the Home, 49
U. MIAMI L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1994) ("Such exemptions are designed primarily to protect
the security of home ownership as well as the security of the home owner and his family.
These exemptions undeniably single out home ownership for special consideration.
Indeed, most such exemptions protect homes directly and do not merely exempt a certain
dollar amount of property from creditors' claims. Further, the homestead exemption is
available to all homeowners and is not limited by policy concerns regarding the particular
financial condition of the person claiming protection. Clearly, homestead exemptions
reflect a unique concern with the sanctity of one's home."); Deborah C. Malamud, 'Who
The Are-or Were": Middle-Class We/fare in the Earl New Deal, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2019,
2021 n.5 (2003) ("Another area of state protection of middle-class respectability was in
bankruptcy, where some states provided generous homestead exemptions.").
In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 355 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); see also David S. Kennedy & R.
Spencer Clift, III, Reasonable and NecessaU Expenses Under Section 1325(b) of the Bankruptg
Code, Postconfirmation Considerations, and the Effect of Conversion and Dismissal of Chapter 13
Cases, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 789, 801 (favorable citation to the Navarro text in article
authored by bankruptcy judge).
Eg., James Rodenberg, Comment, Reasonably NecessaU Expenses or Life of Rile?: The
Diposable Income Test and a Chapter 13 Debtor's Lfesple, 56 Mo. L. REV. 617, 640 (1991)
("[B]ankruptcy courts could establish a percentage limit to use in analyzing a debtor's
monthly housing expenditure. For example, they could use twenty-five percent of net
income as the percentage limit. If the debtor's housing expenditure was less than twentyfive percent of his net income, the expenditure would be presumed reasonable.").
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in contrast to an alternative-akin to the IRS guidelines-that only exempts
expense for a reasonable residence in the debtor's area.
D. Education and Dependent Care
Many cases have examined whether debtors should be permitted to spend
money on educational and dependent-care expenses. Several courts have
taken the status-preservative position that debtors who sent their children to
private school or college prior to bankruptcy should receive continued
support in doing so, especially when the children's attendance has been
longstanding. 68 This policy stands in stark contrast to the lack of a social
guarantee of continued private or tertiary education for the children of nondebtors, even when they could benefit from these forms of education, and the
similar lack of a guarantee to debtors who-perhaps in an effort to curtail
their spending-did not send their children to private school or college.
Some courts have made this observation in refusing to allow bankrupt
debtors to privately educate children where decent public schools are
available.69
Similarly, some courts have taken the position that debtors who spent
money to support their adult children should be allowed to continue doing so:
The factual problem is that the U.S. Trustee wishes, without
malice aforethought, to impose its mindset on the lives of
those who file bankruptcy.
For instance, there are two
68

69

See In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (upholding $260/month
payment for Catholic school on the basis, in part, that "the child has attended Catholic
school her entire life, and therefore this is not a new expense for the debtors" and that
"there would likely be significant emotional cost to the child to change placement in her
final year of elementary school"); In re Riegodedios, 146 B.R. 691, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1992) (upholding $614/month expense for college tuition and rent on the basis that the
expense is not new, since the student is a senior in college).
See Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (disallowing
bankrupt parent's petition to pay for child's private schooling); in re Godios, 333 B.R. 644,
647-48 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying approval of Chapter 7 discharge and stating
that "[w]ere the Court to grant [debtors'] request, what would this Court say to the
countless parents who believe that paying their debts is also a responsibility, and who
therefore exhaust the 'college fund' to do so?"); In re Zaleski, 216 B.R. 425, 432 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1997) ("An expensive education at a private school is hardly a basic need of the
Debtor or his family, particularly when it appears that a similarly high quality education is
available from either of two local state universities."); see also Tabb, supra note 46, at 29
("Why should a debtor who wants to send her children to a private school be allowed to
do so and credit that amount against any means test calculation, while debtors who send
their children to public schools are not given any correlative privilege?").
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children in the Braley home. One is unemployed and in its
motion to dismiss the case for substantial abuse they argue,
"U.S. Trustee believes that debtor is not legally responsible
for the health and welfare of this son." I can't wait to get
home and tell this to my son who just turned eighteen! Dear
Trustee, there may be good reason for keeping them home
after they reach their majority. We do not know what the
Braley story is, but we say with great emphasis that a family
has the basic human right of keeping at home even a
problem child, if that's the case. 70
The judge's suggestion that the "family has the basic human right" to
keep their adult son at home is overstated. Many non-debtors, and indeed
many debtors, cannot afford to keep their adult children at home. Allowing
debtors who previously paid their adult children's expenses to continue doing
so grants them an advantage that is difficult to justify normatively. 71 Perhaps
for this reason, the majority of courts have concluded that debtors may not
transfer resources to their loved ones when those resources would otherwise
go to creditors, unless those loved ones have a legal right to support. 72 A
minority of courts, however, have allowed debtors to support individuals they
are not legally obligated to support.73
70

In re Braley, 103 B.R. 758, 760 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), affd sub nom., Waites v. Braley, 110
B.R. 211 (E.D. Va. 1990). Notably, the judge was confused about the facts of the case.
Id. at 219 ("W]here is no evidence that the Braleys have a son, no evidence that either of
their children is eighteen, and no evidence concerning either child's employment status.
. . . It appears that, as the Trustee suggested at oral arguments, the bankruptcy court
confused the facts of the Braley case with those of another before it.").

71

See Tabb, supranote 46, at 29 ("[W]hy should a debtor who is already caring for a disabled
relative be allowed a deduction while a debtor who needs to start doing so after filing
bankruptcy is not?").

72

E.g., In re Lofty, 437 B.R. 578, 585 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) (disapproving payments to
adult son and grandson because "more than a purely moral obligation is required to
qualify as a dependent"); Coveney v. Costep Servicing Agent (In re Coveney), 192 B.R.

140, 144 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that debtor's "moral obligation to a family
member, who is not a dependent, does not take priority over her legal obligation to repay

her educational loans"); In re Clements, 185 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995)
(rejecting debtors' attempt to pay "relatives they are not legally obligated to support," in
this case adult siblings, before paying "creditors, who [sic] they are legally obligated to re-

n

pay"). For a summary of this topic, see generally Sarah A. Smegal, Moral Obkgadon Should
Not Render an Adult Child a "Dependent," 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 25 (2013).
E.g., In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604, 610 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) ("D]ebtors may
continue to assist (i.e. support) a child, who notwithstanding having attained majority, has

not yet 'left the nest. . . .'"); In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513, 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)
(permitting debtors to pay expenses for 21 year-old daughter).
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II. DEFENSES OF STATUS MAINTENANCE IN BANKRUPTCY

Part I demonstrates that bankruptcy courts are frequently tasked with
detailed inquiries into debtors' property holdings and standard of living.
Courts have observed that this task has complex moral and philosophical
dimensions, and that the language they are asked to interpret offers them little
guidance. As the court in In re Johnson effectively summarizes the challenge:
Since the definition of "disposable income" demands a
delineation between those expenditures which are "reasonably
necessary" from those which are not, this Court must engage
in the unenviable task of scrutinizing the debtor's schedule of
income and expenditures.
This duty, though statutorily
mandated, has understandably caused considerable trepidation
among bankruptcy courts. "Determining what are reasonable
and necessary expenses is an invitation for involvement of the
Bankruptcy Courts in many difficult questions of lifestyle and
philosophy."
Given that the determination is extremely subjective,
except for obvious necessities and luxury items, it is not
surprising that courts have failed to articulate a precise
standard for determining whether a particular expense is
"reasonably necessary." Some courts have engaged in a strict
scrutiny of particular expenses.
Others have been more
deferential to the debtor. 74
As Part I recounted, similar challenges appear throughout bankruptcy
law.

75

74

In re Johnson, 241 BR. 394, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (citation omitted); see also In re
Gonzales, 297 BR. 143, 149 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2003) (discussing the subjective and
philosophical nature of bankruptcy courts' determinations); in re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151, 15657 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[A]n inquiry into a debtor's 'reasonably necessary' expenses
is unavoidably a judgment of values and lifestyles and close questions emerge.... It may
also raise unsettling constitutional and moral issues since what is reasonably necessary to
one debtor may not be reasonably necessary to another."); in re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018,
1021 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) ("The question is how much is a reasonable amount to pay
for basic transportation during the period of the Chapter 13 plan? This question
unavoidably involves the bankruptcy court in difficult value judgments. . . . It's an
unpleasant job, but someone has to do it. The parties, including the debtor, agree that the
'someone' is the bankruptcy judge.") (citation omitted).
See In rejones, 55 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (discussing the similar issues seen
throughout bankruptcy law).

75

Yet, as courts of equity, bankruptcy courts cannot avoid these
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fundamental questions. 76 Furthermore, the sparse legislative history of these
provisions suggests that the legislature intended courts to enjoy broad latitude
in addressing them.77 Despite this, very little has been written to help judges,
trustees, legislators, and others involved in the development of bankruptcy
law grapple with the moral and philosophical challenges they face. Part of
this Article's goal is to offer such a framework.
A prominent study of bankrupt debtors demonstrates the normative
challenge that courts face in deciding what economic benefits debtors should
receive:
Their educations and occupations place them in the middle
class, but their incomes and net worth put them at the
bottom of the class structure.
Where do they belong in the great and shifting American
class scene? Toward the middle with their home-owning
neighbors, classmates, and office colleagues? Or at the
bottom with the homeless, the indigent, and the welfare
recipients, some of whom actually have a greater net worth
than the bankrupt debtors? And how shall we decide where
they fit?78
Focusing on the income and wealth of bankrupt debtors suggests that
they should be treated similarly to non-debtors who rely on social assistance
programs such as food stamps or Medicaid. Yet bankruptcy law, as Part I
demonstrates, frequently works to help formerly wealthy and high-income

76

77

78

See In re Packham, 126 BR. 603, 609 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991) ("While the court attempts to
avoid superimposing its values for those of the debtors', certain sections of the Code
require it to make decisions that unavoidably are made based on its sense of equity of
what is right and wrong."); In re Sutkf 79 BR. at 157 (observing that bankruptcy courts'
decisions "are guided by the court's sense of equity, which lies at the foundation of all
bankruptcy law"); In re Kitson, 65 B.R. 615, 621 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) ("This court
shares Judge White's hesitancy about deciding how individuals should live their lives....
Nevertheless, these judgments must be made and in making them the court must 'be
guided by the Court's sense of equity.'").
In re Jones, 55 B.R. at 465 ("The legislative history, such as there is, expressly leaves the
development of an appropriate standard to the courts."); see also In reJohnson, 241 B.R. at
398 (stating that "the courts may be expected to determine norms" regarding debtors'
permissible spending); cf Michael Moore, Libero and the Consttution (2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law & Business Review).
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE

CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT

73 (2000).
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debtors preserve their pre-bankruptcy social and economic status, even while
providing little or nothing to those who were less well-off pre-bankruptcy.
In this Part, I critically evaluate the normative case in favor of basing
what debtors are permitted to retain on their pre-bankruptcy lifestyle and
otherwise providing debtors with more generous assistance than other
individuals facing economic difficulties receive. I focus on two categories of
arguments. The first, desert-based category of arguments emphasizes that
bankrupt debtors deserve to retain all or some portion of their prebankruptcy lifestyle. The second, efficiency-based category makes the case
that solicitude toward debtors encourages economically productive activity. I
ultimately conclude that neither category justifies enabling bankrupt debtors
to maintain their pre-bankruptcy lifestyles. While bankruptcy should make
possible a decent standard of living and a fair chance at future upward
mobility, there is no justification for prioritizing bankrupt debtors' interests
over those of others seeking these same basic goods.
A. Debtor-Focused Arguments
In this Subpart, I consider three normative arguments for organizing
bankruptcy law to preserve debtors' pre-bankruptcy status. These arguments
all focus on the rights and interests of debtors, as opposed to the interests of
society as a whole.
1. PreservingPastAdvantage
The simple fact that debtors in bankruptcy were previously better-off has
been used to support granting them more solicitude than others in similar
economic straits receive:
[E]ven the monetary data, which show a substantial portion
of the debtors in poverty, contain evidence of the debtors'
once-middle-class
financial
lives:
their
educational
attainments, their formerly higher incomes, and their
substantial rates of homeownership hark back to an earlier
time of more middle-class financial, as well as social, status.
The debtors in our sample include accountants and
computer engineers, doctors and dentists, clerks and
executives, salesclerks and librarians, teachers and
entrepreneurs.
They are middle-class folks who are

Virginia Law & Business Review

476

11:3 (2017)

supposed to be gathering around the barbecues on the patios
outside their three-bedroom, two-bath houses, not waiting to
be examined under oath by their creditors in austere federal
courthouses.79

Elsewhere, they assert that these debtors' "bankruptcies show not that
they have left the middle class but that they are in bankruptcy to hang on to
their fragile position in the middle class." 80
However, it is difficult to see why formerly wealthy debtors' past
advantages entitle them to be favored over never-wealthy debtors or over
non-debtors. Even if we assume that these debtors morally deserved their
former wealth and economic status, those debtors relinquished their desert
claims when they pledged that wealth to others. For instance, a taxicab driver
relinquishes his moral claim to his accumulated fares when he promises to pay
his mechanic some of those fares for taxicab repairs. There is no obvious
case for treating a bankrupt debtor with assets worth $500,000, but debts of
$500,000, differently from a new immigrant or recent graduate with assets
worth $5,000 and debts of $5,000.
If anything, considerations of fairness suggest that bankrupt debtors who
were previously well-off should receive lower priority for assistance. When
deciding which of two children should receive the last cookie in the jar, it is
fairer to give the cookie to the child who has not yet gotten one, even if both
their plates are equally empty right now.8' Similarly, it is fairer to help a new
graduate or immigrant get her first shot at homeownership than to help a
bankrupt debtor to retain the homeownership status he has historically
enjoyed.
Treating the mere fact of past wealth as an entitlement to future wealth
contravenes equal citizenship and enshrines social stratification in law.
Indeed, favoring a debtor on the basis of her past middle-class or
homeownership status, regardless of her current situation, would make
homeownership and middle-class membership akin to a tide of nobility,
which cannot be lost through an economic reversal. Such arrangements are
expressly rejected by the Constitution, 82 and the bar on titles of nobility has
79
80

81
82

Id. at 6.
Id. at 73.
See generaly Bruce Ackerman, Comment on Fried on Gerring What We Don't Deserve, in
ARGUING ABOUT POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 379 (Matt Zwolinski ed., 2009).
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 9-10 (prohibiting the federal and state governments from
granting titles of nobility). For a discussion of the antinobility clauses, see generally
Richard Delgado, Inequalty "From the Top": Applying an Andent Prohibion to an Emerging

11:3 (2017)

Beyond Status Maintenance

477

been suggested as a justification for invalidating laws that favor incumbents
over others.83 One bankruptcy judge has noted the threat of stratification as a
reason to reject a status-preserving approach to bankruptcy:
I do not believe that a debtor's station in life should
serve as justification for treating a jewelry piece as exempt.
"Station in life" . . . . is really a euphemism for a debtor's

pre-bankruptcy economic and social class. Stratification of
debtors along such lines should be anathema to a court
sitting in equity.
The perpetuation of social stratification is also, in this
court's view, inconsistent with the public policy sought to be
promoted by the exemption statutes of this state, and is
fundamentally inconsistent with the history of this state and
the circumstances which surrounded the creation of its
original constitution. 8 4
Ultimately, if stratification is to be justified, more of an argument is
required than the simple fact of past stratification. As the philosopher Eva
Kittay notes, even if "[a] person accustomed to riches and servants all her life
may experience these as needs of such urgency that their absence is
intolerable," the mere experience of past entitlement does not justify claims
on others.
2. Rectfing Bad Luck
A more promising basis for favoring debtors over others would make the
case not merely that debtors used to be better off, but that their economic
setbacks stem from undeserved and unchosen bad luck, whereas others in
similar economic positions-Professor Sullivan et al.'s "homeless . . . indigent
Problem of Distributivejustice,32 UCLA L.

83

84

REV. 100 (1984).
E.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 n.3 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The
American aversion to aristocracy developed long before the Fourteenth Amendment and
is, of course, reflected elsewhere in the Constitution."); cf 457 U.S. at 65 (majority
opinion) (describing "favoring established residents over new residents" as
"constitutionally unacceptable").
In re Leva, 96 B.R. 723, 732 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); see also In re Mitchell, 103 B.R. 819,
823 n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) ("There is no puble policy served in preserving the
lifestyles of the rich and bankrupt.") (emphasis in original). In support of its reasoning,
Leva cites the Republic of Texas's historical prohibition on titles of nobility. See 96 B.R. at
732.
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. . . and welfare recipients" 85-are there because of imprudent choices that
prevented them from amassing wealth or earning high incomes. Favoring the
prudent but unlucky over the imprudent is supported by luck egalitarianism,
an influential theory of distributive justice. 86 Meanwhile, the argument that
bankrupt debtors are unlucky, whereas others with low income or net worth
are imprudent, recalls the sociological distinction between the deserving and
undeserving poor.87
Bankrupt debtors have shown themselves to be
deserving members of society by having previously achieved a position of
economic advantage, while others in similar economic positions have not.8 8
This argument is dubious for two reasons. First, the normative merits of
luck egalitarianism have been strenuously and persuasively challenged. Luck
egalitarianism has a difficult time justifying its choice to abandon the
imprudent to their fate.89 It similarly has a difficult time explaining which
sorts of decisions are prudent ones that entitle individuals to economic
advantage, and the extent to which economic advantage should track
prudence.90
Second, even if luck egalitarianism makes normative sense, favoring
bankrupt debtors over others is a poor way of effecting luck-egalitarian
compensation. Many non-debtors' low or negative net worth results from
unforeseeable and unpreventable bad luck, such as being severely disabled or
being born into a poor family. Meanwhile, many debtors are in bankruptcy

86

SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supranote 78, at 73.
For a recent and legally-informed review of recent work on luck egalitarianism, see Joshua

87

E. Weishart, Transcending Equaky VersusAdequag, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 493-98 (2014).
See Lepage v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 741, 746 n.8 (2d Cir. 1990) C'There is nothing new, of

85

course, in this legislative and administrative effort to distinguish between the 'deserving'
and the 'undeserving' poor.").

88

See A. Mechele Dickerson, America's Uneasj Relationshtp with the Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 17, 51 (1999) (describing some debtors as "able-bodied and financially responsible
people who cannot make ends meet after they encounter an economic crisis like a
financially devastating divorce, involuntary unemployment or recurring, uninsured medical

expenses"); Charles G. Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start"Pol0 in Consumer Bankruptg:A Historical
InventoU and an Interpretive Theo 0 , 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 66 (1986) ("[]here appears to
have been little dispute about the propriety of bankruptcy for consumers whose inability
to pay their debts could be attributed to external economic events or personal

misfortune."); cf In re Latimer, 82 B.R. 354, 358 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (describing debtor
as "dignified, poised, and totally credible," and stating that debtor and wife are "persons
who became accustomed to living with the amenities of the upper middle class, and have
been unable to completely adjust themselves to a somewhat altered financial depression").

89

See general4 Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equai?, 109 ETHICS 287 (1999)
(arguing that luck egalitarianism fails the basic tenets of academic theory).

90

See Susan Hurley & Richard

J.

Arneson, Luck and Equali@, 75 PROC. OF THE

ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 51, 51-72 (2001) (arguing that luck and
responsibility cannot alone determine distribution of resources).
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due to reasonable, intentional choices-such as home purchases or career
changes-that turned out badly: their bad fortune constitutes what theorists
of distributive justice call bad option luck, in contrast with bad brute luck.91
Others are in bankruptcy due to plain imprudence.
A refinement of the luck egalitarian argument focuses solely on
dependents' lack of culpability: as Richard Flint puts it, "[t]he family unit
should not suffer the consequences of financial mistakes in which it did not
directly participate." 92 However, this argument also fails to establish that
debtors are more deserving than non-debtors. While the children of formerly
wealthy bankrupt debtors certainly did not choose to go bankrupt, the
children of the never-wealthy poor similarly did not choose their
disadvantaged position. The most morally tenable position is equal concern
for both groups.
3. ComparingDebtors to Creditors
Ultimately, the most compelling argument for maintaining debtors' prebankruptcy status abandons any claim to preference for debtors over nondebtors. Instead, it claims that preserving debtors' status-even if it is less
important than helping poor non-debtors-is a more important goal than
ensuring that creditors are repaid.
Some courts have explicitly given less weight to the interests of wealthier
creditors on the basis that they face no serious hardship, and are better able to
bear the burden of economic shocks.93
Commentators have similarly
94
recommended differentiating the claims of different types of creditors.
91
92

93

94

See Weishart, supranote 86, at 494.
Richard E. Flint, Bankruptg Poll0 : Toward a Moraljusaficadonfor FinandalRehabiltadon of the
Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 515, 537 (1991).
E.g., Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 447 P.2d 638, 644 (Cal. 1968) ("[F]inanciers are obviously
better able than buyers to absorb the loss of an occasional bad deal."); Unico v. Owen,
232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967) (observing that "the financer-creditor is better able to
absorb the impact of a single imprudent or unfair exchange"); see also Koppen v. Union
Iron & Foundry Co., 163 S.W. 560, 564 (Mo. App. 1914) (describing exemptions as
serving to "secure to those who toil with their hands, or depend for their subsistence
upon their personal earnings, a sufficient amount of the fruits of their labor to supply
them and their families with the necessities of life and a few of the conveniences of
modern civilization, free from the merciless grasp of their less need creditors") (emphasis
added).
See Margaret Howard, A Theo 0 of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptg, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047,
1063-64 (1987) (justifying bankruptcy discharge in part on the basis that commercial
lenders have a greater ability to predict and bear losses than do individual debtors); Note,
A Permanent Bankruptg Chapterfor Farmers: An Anajlsis of Legislative Proposals, 56 YALE L.J.
982, 1007 (1947) (contrasting situations where a "creditor is an individual investor, such as
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Some courts have also criticized creditors for being complicit in debtors'
inability to repay, and suggested that this conduct weakens their entitlement
to repayment.95 Commentators have similarly argued that where creditors
have offered loans without a reasonable expectation that debtors will be able
to repay them, their normative entitlement to repayment is reduced. 96 This
has been used to argue for the subordination of irresponsible lenders'
claims,9 7 and for permitting the modification of residential mortgages in

bankruptcy.98
However, what is fair in the "smaller moral world" that exists between a
debtor and her creditors may be unfair when assessed in light of the larger
distributive landscape.99 For instance, requiring a wealthy corporation to

.

9s

an elderly farmer who has sold his farm by mortgage and retired to live on the income
from it" with those where the creditor is an institutional investor, and advocating "shifting
the loss of cyclical land value fluctuations from individual farmers to institutional
investors").
See In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 219-20 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (contending that
"consumer creditors, including credit card providers, may bear some responsibility" for
excessive indebtedness, and asking rhetorically "[i]f a creditor, after reviewing a debtor's
monthly charges, does not heed plain indications of over-extension, then is there not
blame to share if the creditor continues to lend money to the debtor and the debtor does
not pay?"); f Bank of Am. v. Jarczyk, 268 B.R. 17, 24 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) ("This Court
shares the bankruptcy court's concern over irresponsible lending practices utilized by
many credit card companies . .
E.g, A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught? Whj Credit-Focused
Debtor Education Ma Not Work, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 945, 961 (1999) (suggesting that
Congress "should reform bankruptcy laws to ensure that creditors who make
irresponsible lending decisions are directly or indirectly penalized in bankruptcy cases");
Susan Block-Lieb, A Humanisic Vision ofBankruptg Law, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 471,
476 & n.40 (1998) (reviewing KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING
THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997) (collecting and reviewing justifications for the
bankruptcy discharge "as a necessary curb on negligent lending practices in the consumer
finance industry")); Richard L. Stehl, The Faiingsof the Cred Counseing and DebtorEducation
Requirements of the Proposed Consumer Bankruptg Reform Legisladon of 1998, 7 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 133, 141 (1999) ("[qritics of credit card issuers submit that immoderate
credit policies have fueled the increase in consumer bankruptcies . . . ."); Catherine E.
Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptg Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
361, 414 (2003) (arguing that irresponsible lending serves to drive consumers into
bankruptcy).
E.g., F. Stephen Knippenberg, Re-Purposing Dram Shop Law to Subor&nate the Claims of
Reckless Bartenders of Credt Drunks: In Bankruptg, This One Should Be on the House, 52 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 39, 61 (2013).
Susan E. Hauser, Cutting the GordianKnot: The CaseforAlowing Modification of Home Mortgages
in Bankruptg, 5 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 207, 229 (2010) ("[A]llowing residential mortgages to
be modified in bankruptcy forces lenders, servicers, and investors to bear some of the
costs of the irresponsible loan-underwriting decisions that allowed disaster to strike when
home prices fell.").
I take the notion of different "moral worlds" within which we might evaluate an action

96

97

98

99
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sacrifice a few thousand dollars so that a debtor can keep her child in private
school may be a fitting response when only the debtor's and creditor's
interests are concerned. However, responding to comparative desert between
debtor and creditor may unfairly advantage the debtor's child over the child
of poor parents next door.1 00 One way of resolving these distributive
unfairnesses would be to ensure that some of the sacrifices imposed on the
creditor go to benefit poor non-debtors, rather than solely benefiting the
bankrupt debtor. This option is discussed further in Part III.
B. Society-Focused Arguments
The arguments in the previous Subpart focused on debtors' individual
claims to retain their pre-bankruptcy standard of living. In contrast, the
arguments evaluated in this Subpart make the case that helping debtors retain
their pre-bankruptcy standard of living is beneficial to society more generally.
1. BncouragingEntrepreneurshtp
The economist Michelle White contends that the personal bankruptcy
process encourages entrepreneurial behavior:

'

Individuals face more risk when they start businesses than
when they work for others, because they are personally liable
for their business debts. Having a personal bankruptcy
procedure raises their consumption when business failure
occurs by discharging both their business and personal debts.
It therefore makes risk-averse individuals more likely to go
into business in the first place and more likely to start a
second business if the first one fails.' 0

from Christine Korsgaard, The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between
Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS (Christine
1oo
101

Korsgaard ed., 1996).
See sources cited supra note 69.
Michelle J. White, Bankruptg: Past Puzzles, Recent Reforms, and the Mongage Crisis 3 (Nat'l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
14549,
2008),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4549; see also Jason J. Kilborn, Merg, Rehabiltaion, and
Quid Pro Quo: A Radical Reassessment of Inadkidual Bankruptg, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 864
(2003) (considering arguments that "the discharge provides a liability safety valve to
encourage entrepreneurial individuals to take commercial risks for the benefit of society").
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However, while allowing entrepreneurial individuals to discharge their
debts while retaining assets improves their economic position, bankruptcy
also depresses the economic position of their creditors. The social welfare
gains from encouraging entrepreneurship by allowing debtors to discharge
their debts while retaining their pre-bankruptcy assets must therefore be
weighed against the social welfare losses caused by the policy. We would be
skeptical of other programs that purport to provide socially productive
support for entrepreneurs, such as requiring that merchants sell their goods to
entrepreneurs at a discount or offer more generous return terms to failed
entrepreneurs.
This skepticism becomes even more intense when the
maintenance of entrepreneurs' consumption directly conflicts with other
social priorities, such as affordable health care or early childhood education,
as happens when entrepreneurs receive discharges of medical or tax debts.
Additionally, not all bankrupt debtors are entrepreneurs; a more narrowly
targeted way of helping entrepreneurs, such as low-interest small business
loans, might well provide greater benefits than an expansive bankruptcy
discharge.
Ultimately, the societal welfare case in favor of bankruptcy exemptions as
entrepreneurship incentives is unclear, requiring an empirical analysis that
compares the benefits of increased entrepreneurship with the costs to
creditors and the public from discharged debts.1 02 White suggests that while a
fresh-start policy (i.e. an exemption of future earnings) makes sense, the
optimal level for asset exemptions is much lower. 03
2. Insuring the Well-Off
The legal scholar Richard Hynes identifies a different societal welfare case
in favor of bankruptcy exemptions, which appeals to the idea that bankruptcy
serves as consumption insurance. Hynes argues that "one can defend
[bankruptcy] laws that allow wealthier debtors to maintain a standard of living
beyond the reach of the poor by noting that wealthier individuals typically
insure a higher standard of living for themselves."104 Because there is no

102

103

104

Cf In re Oakley, 344 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[G]enerous-seeming exemptions from
debt collection don't necessarily benefit debtors. The harder it is to collect a debt, the
higher the interest rate that lenders will charge, with the result that debtors as a whole, as
distinct from the subset of defaulting debtors, may actually be hurt by a "generous"
scheme of exemptions.").
White, supra note 101, at 5-6 (arguing that "the optimal earnings exemption in bankruptcy
is relatively high, while the optimal asset exemption is relatively low").
Hynes, Non-ProcrusteanBankruptcy, supra note 9, at 350; see also White, supra note 101, at 3
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market for privately provided wealth insurance, Hynes suggests that the
government should step in to provide this insurance through bankruptcy law.
However, the inference from the lack of private access to wealth
insurance to the claim that it should be provided through the legal system is
dubious. Hynes' argument depends on the assumption that providing wealth
insurance to the wealthy can be done without imposing any costs on those
worse-off, and ideally can be done in a way that improves overall societal
welfare. But, as Hynes concedes, it is possible that poorer people will bear
some of the costs of providing private wealth insurance. 05
More generally, Hynes's primary argument in favor of bankruptcy law's
status-maintaining features does not defend these features as directly
desirable, but instead as no worse than other social programs that provide
more to the formerly wealthy than to the never-wealthy. Hynes suggests in
closing that "fully embracing the arguments against the generous debt relief
afforded the very wealthy may logically lead to a world in which bankruptcy
seeks only to save us from the abject poverty that our poorest citizens must
endure,"10 6 but he does not explain why such a more limited design for
bankruptcy would be normatively undesirable.
III. HUMANE BANKRUPTCY LAW WITHOUT STATUS MAINTENANCE

The previous two Parts have described and criticized the statusmaintaining approach to bankruptcy law.
But as Richard Epstein has
contended, "it takes a theory to beat a theory." 07 Accordingly, status
maintenance is likely to stick around, despite its faults, unless some better
theory is provided to take its place. This Part makes the positive case for
reorienting bankruptcy law around three core values: economic adequacy for
debtors, economic freedom for debtors, and fairness to non-debtors.

105

106

107

("Bankruptcy reduces the downside risk of borrowing by discharging some or all debt
when debtors' ability-to-repay turns out to be low. It therefore provides debtors with
partial consumption insurance. Assuming that debtors are risk-averse, having some
consumption insurance makes them better off and increases their willingness to
borrow.").
Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptg, supra note 9, at 360 ("[O]ne may raise legitimate
questions about the underlying assumptions. For example, one may believe that the costs
of the generous debt relief bestowed on the very wealthy are borne by other debtors or
consumers more generally. One may also believe that the market failure that makes debt
relief necessary does not justify the full extent of relief that the law currently provides.").
Id. at 360-61.
Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, LaborLaw, and Realo: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and
Ko/ler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983).
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A. Meeting Debtors' Needs: Universal, Adequacy-Based Limits
One widely recognized goal of bankruptcy law is to protect debtors
against absolute economic inadequacy-that is, to protect them from poverty
and destitution, and to ensure that they enjoy a decent social minimum. This
goal is commonly recognized as a basis for the provision of asset exemptions
and other debtor protections.108 Additionally, economic adequacy is a
normatively compelling policy goal that receives wide endorsement from a
variety of philosophical and legal perspectives.109
Some commentators have argued that courts should not attempt to
define adequacy:
Does any court, or governmental body for that matter, have
the ability to determine what the appropriate lifestyle is for a
particular person? What a judge may regard as a luxury may
in fact be regarded by the debtor as a necessity. It is one
thing to determine whether expenditures are incurred in
good faith (as was required under the Code); it is quite
another to determine whether they are excessive or
unnecessary. Should courts be making personal judgments
on a lifestyle where there are no legal standards to provide
guidance or instruction?
How can these decisions be
reviewed? Can a body of principled precedent emerge? Is
not any decision of this nature inescapably based on the
arbitrary predilections of the trier of fact and should we
repose such decisions in courts?

108

See, e.g., Talmadge v. Duck (In re Talmadge), 832 F.2d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Exemption statutes save for the debtor certain items owned or possessed by him or her
which comprise the minimum of things necessary to prevent the debtor from becoming
destitute and which would otherwise be taken by creditors."); In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463,
465-66 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996) ("The historical purpose of exemptions in Nevada is to
protect a debtor by permitting him to retain the basic necessities of life so that after the
levy of nonexempt property he and his family will not be left destitute."); see also In re
Edwards, No. 03-10018, 2004 WL 316418, at *11 (Bankr. D. Vt. Feb. 13, 2004)
(describing "reasonably necessary" standard as "a standard of 'adequacy'"); In re Meyer,
211 B.R. 203, 212 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) ("The fundamental purpose of property
exemption statutes is to protect a debtor and his dependents from absolute poverty

109

See, e.g., Weishart, supranote 86, at 512 & n.187, 529.
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Second, and somewhat related, are the disturbing moral
implications in having any governmental body decide what a
person "needs" for food and shelter.110
This argument seems to depend on the concealed and mistaken premise
that courts (and governmental bodies more generally) are unjustifiably
intruding on debtors' private, self-regarding conduct when they prescribe
standards of adequacy. This premise has the same flaw as the cry that
government should-impossibly-"keep its hands off our Medicare.""' As
courts have repeatedly pointed out, allowing debtors in bankruptcy to retain
or spend resources is different from allowing non-debtors to do so, because
debtors' resources are in a sense the property of their creditors.11 2 As such,
110

"

112

See In re Kitson, 65 B.R. 615, 619 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (quoting Irving A. Breitowitz,
New Developments in Consumer Bankrupdes: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial
Abuse," 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 353 (1985)).
See Frank McClellan, Health Dispaities, Health Care Reform, Moraly, and the Law: "Keep Your
Government Hands Off M Meacare," 82 TEMP. L. REv. 1141, 1148 (2010) ("Because
Medicare is a government program, the response of the legislator who was conducting the
town hall meeting was one of puzzlement.
It is difficult to determine how the
government could keep its hands off of its own program.").
E.g., In re Maura, 491 B.R. 493, 514 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) ("Debtors want the Court
to require their creditors to help fund the private, religious education of the Debtors'
children."); In re Morgantini, No. 10-61077-B-13, 2011 WL 10676928, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (rejecting various proposed expenditures on dining, lawn care, and
tree trimming on the basis that they constitute luxuries at the expense of creditors); In re
Culcasi, No. 10-14735-JMD, 2011 WL 4005451, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 7, 2011)
("Allowing Mr. Culcasi to stay employed in a losing business effectively forces the
Debtors' creditors to subsidize his business while the creditors receive less payment on
their claims."); In re Stitt, 403 B.R. 694, 705 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (denying confirmation
of a plan that would require "creditors to subsidize" debtor's excessive housing expenses
and unprofitable business); In re Law, No. 07-40863, 2008 WL 1867971, at *7 (Bankr. D.
Kan. Apr. 24, 2008) ("The . .
question is whether Debtor's creditors should, in effect,
subsidize Debtor's adult son who may well be fully capable of working and supporting
himself? Congress appears to have answered this latter question in the negative."); In re
Beckerman, 381 B.R. 841, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) ("The Debtors' intentions to
support their children are understandable, but in doing so they require their creditors, who
receive nothing in the chapter 7 proceeding, to unwittingly bear that cost."); In re Savoie,
No. 05-13263 DWS, 2005 WL 2476268, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2005) ("[T]he
Debtors have made the choice to have their creditors pay for their daughter's expensive
education without realizing any of the pain themselves."); In re Evans, 334 B.R. 148, 151
(Bankr. D. Md. 2004) ("To state the issue bluntly, after paying his brother and discharging
an obligation guaranteed by his brother, Mr. Evans wants his creditors to help finance the
education of his daughter at a distinguished private university and to help him pay off a
student loan owing by him for the education of an adult son."); In re Ventling, No. 0101153-CH, 2002 WL 34553560, at *8 (Bankr. S.D. IowaJune 6, 2002) ("However, it is not
appropriate to require unsecured creditors to subsidize a house that Terence aptly
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debtors' economic decisions are not merely private matters, but instead
matters of public policy that impose identifiable and clear burdens on others.
While courts and other governmental bodies should not try to determine
what a truly good life would be for each person, they have both the ability
and responsibility to determine what resources people are entitled to legally
demand from others. In sum, courts cannot just leave decisions about what
constitutes adequacy in the hands of debtors themselves.
In doing the work of determining what constitutes adequacy, courts must
avoid either overestimating or underestimating what adequacy requires. On
the overestimation side, a Seventh Circuit decision by Judge Posner suggests
that "$4000 is a very modest estimate of the amount of tangible property that
a person needs to survive as a self-respecting citizen rather than as a beggar or
a derelict."11 3

But, as many students can no doubt attest, an individual

without a car renting a furnished (or even unfurnished) home or apartment
can survive-and even thrive-with far less than $4,000 worth of tangible
property.11 4 Meanwhile, on the underestimation side, many courts have
refused to count cellular phone or Internet access as reasonable for
debtors,"15 even though poor non-debtors receive subsidized access to cellular
described as a 'money pit' ....

*");

In re McNichols, 249 BR. 160, 172 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.

2000) (refusing to "leave the debtor's unsecured creditors to subsidize the spouse's

expenses"); In re Bayless, 264 BR. 719, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1999) ("This Court
refuses

to

approve a plan

that requires unsecured creditors

to subsidize

fertility

treatments."); In re McDonald, 232 BR. 818, 820 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (allowing debtors
in bankruptcy to exclude church donations from their income "would permit the Debtors
to require that their creditors contribute to their chosen charity"); In re Soper, 152 BR.
985, 988 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993) ("requiring the creditors to subsidize part of the nondebtor spouse's living expenses was a violation of the Code"); In re Packham, 126 BR.
603, 610 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991) (rejecting interpretation of bankruptcy law on which a
"debtor could budget charitable donations to an organization of its choice thereby forcing
its creditors to make de facto contributions to that organization"); In re Curry, 77 BR.

969, 970 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (similar); In re Webb, 75 BR. 264, 265 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986) ("The purpose of debtor rehabilitation is disserved if the bankruptcy courts must be
used in order to afford debtors a basis for making their creditors pay for their luxuries and

113
114
115

gifts.").
In re Oakley, 344 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2003).
Cf Alex Williams, Whj Se/f-Hep Guru James Altucher 0nl Owns 15 Things, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2016, at ST1.
In re Williams, 475 B.R. 489, 494 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012) ("[]he debtors have not shown
any reason why they need any cell service in addition to their land line."); In re Morgantini,

2011 WL 10676928, at *5 n.6 ("It is this court's observation that family-wide, full high
cost cellular telephone/internet service is becoming an expectation in a growing number
of chapter 13 bankruptcy cases. Until the IRS Standards recognize 'smart phones' and
unlimited texting as a 'necessary and reasonable' expense, the courts should be reluctant
to set that standard as the new 'normal.'"); In re Oltjen, No. 07-60534-RCM, 2007 WL

2329695, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2007) ("The Debtor provided no information
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phone and Internet services" 6-which are near-essentials in modern job
markets.117 Courts must be careful to differentiate judgments about whether
a debtor's lifestyle is adequate as a public policy matter from judgments about
whether the judge would be happy living that lifestyle.
Ultimately, a focus on ensuring economic adequacy for all debtors
disfavors the status-maintenance approach, and favors the use of either a
reasonableness approach or one of the universalist tests. Reasonableness
approaches have the advantage of being able to address the distinctive
circumstances that individual debtors face, including medical conditions,
dependent care, and local housing and commuting costs.
However,
universalist frameworks like the IRS guidelines and the poverty line have the
advantage of treating debtors more similarly to non-debtors, of allowing
debtors more flexibility regarding their spending, and of giving judges
guidance concerning complicated factual questions.
The universalist
frameworks also further the normatively desirable goal of publicity-that
justice should not only be done, but also be seen as being done.118
B. Protecting Debtors' Freedom: Rehabilitation and Flexibility
While the objective importance of protecting adequacy requires courts to
engage in some investigation of debtors' economic choices, the legal system

116

11

118

other than the $44 cost of her monthly internet service, for example, she provided no
information why she needs internet service or why an internet expense at this dollar level
is reasonably necessary for her maintenance or support."); In re Schrodemier, No. 0404426, 2005 WL 783066, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 4, 2005) ("The Court concludes
that Debtor has no present need for a cell phone. He has a phone in his home.
Admittedly, a cell phone in today's world is a convenient item. However, for someone
who is having difficulty balancing his expenses and who is presently in Chapter 7
bankruptcy, a cell phone is a luxury item.").
See 47 C.E.R. § 54.409 (2015) (setting out qualifications for the FCC's Lifeline service);
Stephanie Mariani, Universal Internet Access As A Tool to Fight Povero: The FCC's Lifedne
Program, 23 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 551, 552 (2016) (discussing "the FCC's recent
decision to subsidize broadband Internet for low-income Americans").
See, e.g., United States v. Ullmann, 788 F.3d 1260, 1263 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2015) (observing
that "Internet use is necessary for many jobs, is essential to access information ranging
from the local news to critical government documents, and is the encouraged medium for
filing tax returns, registering to vote, and obtaining various permits and licenses," and
collecting similar cases).
On the importance of making distributive principles public, see Andrew Mason, justice,
Hosm, and Princjles, 15 RES PUBLICA 179, 191 (2009) ("Publicly checkable rules also
contribute to stability. When the application of principles can be checked by others, and
justice can be seen to be done, one potential source of conflict and mistrust is removed,
making social institutions more effective, stable and enduring, and thereby helping
individuals to make plans and pursue their own conceptions of the good.").
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Such
need not scrutinize every detail of a debtor's economic future.
punctilious management of the debtor's post-bankruptcy future would run
counter to Local Loan's normatively attractive proposal that bankruptcy law
offer debtors a "clear field for future effort."11 9 While fairness to creditors
and the public justifies imposing some limits on debtors' economic choices,
these limits need not take the form of line-item examination.
Just as providing economic adequacy is a widely endorsed normative goal,
so too is the provision of economic freedom. While economic freedom is
consistent with restraint by reasonable laws, just as economic adequacy need
not involve access to luxuries, economic freedom typically includes latitude in
selecting one's occupation and choosing which personal possessions will
serve one's plan of life.1 2 0 The goal of affording debtors some postbankruptcy freedom is best achieved by providing flexible, rather than rigid,
exemptions. Even if offering a flexible asset exemption involves some
unfairness to non-debtors by requiring them to subsidize the idiosyncratic
projects of former debtors, it also avoids burdensome involvement by
creditors or by society in the bankrupt debtor's affairs. As Seana Shiffrin
observes:
[C]ost-extraction at every opportunity and in every context
can be wearing. It may also detract significantly from the
feelings of community that are generated by such
cooperation and part of their impetus. Pricing every action
feels picayune, like bean-counting. Often it involves a great
deal of observation and accounting that may itself chill or
distort autonomous expression.121
Providing flexible exemptions that different debtors can use to protect
different types of assets best promotes the goal of freedom for debtors. Such

119
120

121

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
See, e.g., State v. Nuss, 114 N.W.2d 633, 635 (S.D. 1962) (observing that "economic
freedom is one of the inherent rights guaranteed to all men by . . . the South Dakota
Constitution" and "includes freedom of action; freedom to own, control, and use
property, and freedom to pursue any lawful trade, business, or calling," but "is subject to
reasonable restraint and regulation by the state, under the police power, to protect the
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the people"); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OFJUSTICE 242 (1999) (discussing "the important liberty of free choice of occupation"); id.
at xvi (recognizing a "right to personal property as necessary for citizens' independence
and integrity").
Seana V. Shiffrin, Paternalsm, Unconsdonabilo Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205, 238 (2000).
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an approach is normatively superior, on economic freedom grounds, to one
that closely scrutinizes newspaper bills while affording unlimited exemptions
for homesteads. Many bankruptcy scholars have advocated for lump-sum
asset exemptions,1 22 and some also for lump-sum income exemptions.1 23 My
goal has been to connect advocacy for a lump-sum exemption to the
normative goal of greater economic freedom.
The goal of economic freedom also favors more generous access to a
post-bankruptcy fresh start over larger exemptions. Rather than encouraging
or requiring bankrupt debtors to maintain their former lifestyles in Chapter 13
bankruptcy while turning over some specified sum of future earnings to
creditors, creditors have a clearer field for their future efforts under a Chapter
7 model with less generous exemptions, in which they start over from a
genuine zero point, neither encumbered by past debts nor entitled to past
assets. Economic freedom, however, does not require a completely fresh
start-as the next Subpart will discuss, individuals are not altogether deprived
of freedom by being required to pay some debts they incurred prior to
bankruptcy.124
122

123

124

See Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformi in Consumer Bankruptg: Means Testig as a Distracion
and the National Bankruptg Review Commission's Proposals as a Startin Point, 6 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 1, 18 (1998) C'With a lump sum federal exemption amount ($20,000, in
addition to the homestead, or $35,000 if no homestead exemption is taken), the
Commission would permit debtors to make idiosyncratic choices and end the unfairness
in the current system, where a few debtors can shelter a lot of property, while others
cannot keep certain items of particular importance to them .
); Richard E. Mendales,
Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptg, 40 B.C. L. REV. 851, 877 (1999) (advocating for "a
different concept for exemptions in bankruptcy, which would establish an overall exempt
amount and let the debtor choose property of any kind valued up to that limit"); see also
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPo@1 in Bankruptg Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1435
(1985) ("Society could allow the debtor to exempt a specific amount (say, $25,000 worth)
of existing assets (over and above human capital and, perhaps, wage substitutes) and leave
the individual to decide which of his existing assets to exempt."); Michelle J. White, Whj It
Pais to Filefor Bankruptg: A CritcalLook at the Incentives Under U.S. PersonalBankruptg Law
and a Proposalfor Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 713 (1998) (suggesting "a uniform asset
exemption in bankruptcy"). But see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectiu of Well-Being
and the Objectives of Propero Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1730 (2003) (arguing that the
"protection of a plurality of types of property and not some global amount of wealth" can
be normatively justified).
See Kilborn, supra note 101, at 886 ("Whether it be all of the debtor's garnishable income
for seven years, twenty-five percent of any net annual income in excess of $50,000 for
four years, or ten percent of gross earnings for three years, a uniform standard is crucial to
avoid an elaborate and expensive bureaucratic structure that makes subjective and valueladen determinations of ability to pay.").
Cf lain Ramsay, Comparadve Consumer Bankruptg, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 251 (2007)
(discussing European bankruptcy law's aversion to a complete discharge of prebankruptcy debts).
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C. Fairness to Non-Debtors
The prior two Subparts have set out the positive case in favor of two
ways in which bankruptcy law should help debtors: by ensuring that they have
In
economic sufficiency, and by promoting their economic freedom.
contrast, this Subpart examines a third normative goal, equality, and in so
doing considers how bankruptcy law can be fair to non-debtors, including
both creditors and individuals who neither lend nor borrow.
One advocate reports that her introductory students frequently suggest a
creative way of making bankruptcy law more equal:
One of my favorite questions about the exemptions, often
asked by very beginner bankruptcy students is, "what if the
debtor does not have a home or a car? Can he or she just
get $18,450 in cash in lieu of a home, or $2,950 in cash in
lieu of a car?" I ask "from where?" You have to have
property from which to claim an exemption in order to get
the benefit of that exemption.1 25
The advocate's proposition is correct as a description of what the law is:
exemptions are of no value to those without property. However-as argued
in Part B-when considering what the law shouldbe, it is difficult to justify the
ways in which bankruptcy law favors debtors who were well-off prior to
bankruptcy over poorer debtors and over non-debtors.
Many aspects of bankruptcy law compare debtors' interests with those of
creditors. Courts have frequently described the bankruptcy process as an
equitable balancing of creditors' and debtors' interests.1 26 Yet, even though
courts are frequently solicitous of poorer debtors and skeptical of better-off
debtors, they less often examine the economic circumstances of creditors.
125
126

Martin, supranote 10, at 232 n.103 (emphasis in original).
See Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commw. Mortg. Corp. (in re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d
1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986) (describing the requirement that bankruptcy be filed in good
faith as furthering "the balancing process between the interests of debtors and creditors
which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws"); In re Sumner, 178 B.R.
16, 18 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995) ("Bankruptcy is often concerned with balancing the
equities between a creditor's right to payment and a debtor's need for relief."); In re Miller,
167 B.R. 782, 784 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity
charged with balancing the interests of debtors and their creditors."); In re Chapman, 146
B.R. 411, 419 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (describing "the classic balancing that a bankruptcy
court must consider in virtually all areas of the Bankruptcy Code, i.e. the need to balance
the debtor's pursuit of a fresh financial start versus the creditors' right to fair treatment").
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One court has even suggested that but for a (now-repealed) provision
concerning divorced spouses, bankruptcy law never calls for a
"thoroughgoing analysis of a creditor's financial circumstances, much less a
weighing of them against the debtor's."1 27 This is not quite right. While
courts less often attend to creditors' circumstances than to debtors', they
neither ignore them entirely, nor refuse outright to compare the two. Rather,
one court has stated that, in deciding whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition
is filed in good faith, "it is appropriate that the Court consider . . the effects
upon the petitioner and his creditors should relief under Chapter 7 be granted
"128

The clearest case where exemptions treat non-debtors and poorer debtors
inequitably occurs when the creditor is a taxpayer-funded entity. In these
circumstances, bankrupt debtors seeking to keep their homes, donate money
to charity, or send their children to private school are redirecting taxpayer
money to pursue their own private ends. One court made this point
effectively in considering the case of a physician who wanted to avoid
repaying a debt to the National Health Service Corps after declining the
assignment she received from the Corps:
The test for unconscionability is not whether repayment
of an NHSC obligation would prevent the debtor from
maintaining the standard of living of the average physician or
the standard of living to which the debtor is accustomed.
Average taxpayers subsidize the medical education of NHSC
scholarship recipients. Requiring such recipients who flout
their service commitments to live like average taxpayers is
not 'unconscionable. 2 9
Michelle Arnopol Cecil suggests that federal income tax debts-which, if
paid, would have produced revenues used to support public programs-are

127
128

129

Brasslett v. Brasslett (In re Brasslett), 233 B.R. 177, 185 n.15 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999).
In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 873 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (emphasis in original); see also In re
Bell, 56 B.R. 637, 640 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (employing White approach); f Hughes v.
Farrar, 45 Me. 72, 74 (Me. 1858) (declining to adopt statutory construction that "would
enable the poor debtor to ride a horse of great value, while, possibly, his poor creditor
might be obliged to walk, or to ride the one diseased and discarded"); Buckingham v.
Billings, 13 Mass. 82, 87 (Mass. 1816) (rejecting interpretation of exemption statute on
which "the situation of the debtor will often be preferable to that of the creditor").
Barrows v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm'n (In re Barrows), 182 B.R. 640, 652 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994) (quoting Matthews v. Pineo (in re Matthews), 19 F.3d 121, 125 (1994)).

492

Virginia Law & Business Review

11:3 (2017)

involved in nearly one-fifth of bankruptcies.13 0 And Elizabeth Warren and
Melissa Jacoby note that nonprofit and charitable creditors collect debts in
order to serve others who need their aid.131 A bankruptcy that leaves debts to
a public hospital unpaid reduces the funds available to care for ill or needy
people.
Even when the creditor is a public entity, it may make sense for bankrupt
debtors to be able to keep the amount of resources that society would
otherwise be obliged to spend supporting them via social assistance programs.
However, it is mistaken to assert-as many cases do-that debtors who
receive exemptions can entirely avoid imposing costs on the public merely by
avoiding reliance on assistance programs for the needy.1 32 As Warren herself
has rightly pointed out, better-off individuals in society-including debtors
who benefit from exemptions-also benefit from public infrastructure and
assistance ranging from transportation to national defense to tax credits for
homeownership.1 33 Furthermore, it is difficult to justify allowing debtors to
retain more resources than they would receive from social assistance
programs when doing so would come at the expense of those who are worse
off. Forgiveness or discharge of a tax debt, for instance, is equivalent to a
direct transfer of money from the government to a bankrupt debtor. This is a
difficult practice to justify, given that non-debtors generally cannot receive
direct cash transfers even for the more urgent goal of economic sufficiency,
and certainly cannot receive them in order to maintain their lifestyles.134

130

131
132

133

Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Crumbsfor Oiver Twist Resolving the Conlct Between Tax and Support
Claims in Bankruptg, 20 VA. TAX REV. 719, 743 & n.101 (2001).
Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond HospitalMisbehavior:An Alernative Account of
Meical-RelatedFinandalDistress, 100 Nw. U. L. REV 535, 580-81 (2006).
See, e.g., Taylor v. Rainier Equip. Fin. (In re Taylor), 861 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1988)
(asserting that bankruptcy law "allows the debtor to exempt certain property from the
estate . . . to ensure that the debtor will not become 'a public charge"'); Schriar v. A.K.
Mose (In re Schriar), 284 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1960) (describing a goal of exemption as
"the prevention of any possibility that the debtor or his family might become a public
charge upon the state"); In re Bums, 482 B.R. 164, 166 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2012) ("State law
exemption statutes codify a public policy which protects some assets from seizure so that
the debtor or his family will not become a burden on the state."); Panuska v. Johnson (In
re Johnson), 124 B.R. 290, 296 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (describing a purpose of
exemption laws as being "to prevent impecunious debtors from burdening the public
purse by resorting to charity and welfare programs").

Lucy Madison, E/zabeth Warren: 'There is nobod in this county who got rich on his own," CBS
(Sept. 22, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/elizabeth-warrenthere-is-nobody-in-this-country-who-got-rich-on-his-own/.
See Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountabi/ty, and the New PoveriAgenda, 2010 WIs. L. REV.
239, 244 (2010) ("With the exception of a limited number of states where state programs
provide some level of cash assistance when families hit the federal time limit, across the
NEWS
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When the creditor is a smaller firm or an individual, the case for generous
income and asset exemptions is also weak. It makes little normative sense for
a bankrupt debtor to be able to retain a standard of living higher than a
creditor by failing to repay a personal loan, or for a debtor to maintain a
middle-class lifestyle while the owners and employees of a small firm face a
difficult time making ends meet. Courts have attended closely to the interests
of poor creditors whose economic survival requires the payment of debts they
are owed, 35 and commentators have made similar proposals.' 36
The case for generous exemptions is strongest when the creditor is a
large, private-sector firm. Other areas of law require large, private-sector
firms to attend more carefully to the well-being of those with whom they
interact.' 37 Just as large firms may have a greater obligation to pay a minimum
wage or otherwise address their employees' basic needs than to address the
basic needs of non-employees, they may similarly have a greater obligation to
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nation today, poor individuals receive no cash assistance to help them meet their basic
needs.'.
See Margell v. Bouquet Invs. (In re Bouquet Invs.), 32 B.R. 988, 991 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1983) (observing that institutional creditors are generally better able to bear economic
burdens than individual creditors, and that even though "it may seem that courts should
not use that sort of fact as a consideration," "it seems to me logically impossible not to
consider at least indirectly the economic situation of the parties"); see also In re Bennett,
No. 07-10864-SSM, 2008 WL 1869308, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2008)
("Frequently-particularly when the creditor is a private individual-nonpayment of a
legitimate debt can work a genuine hardship."); In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 874 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1985) (sympathetically considering the interests of physically injured tort
creditor, though ultimately granting Chapter 7 relief to debtor); f Young v. Sodaro, 456
S.E.2d 31, 35 n.9 (W. Va. 1995) (noting, in rejection of debtor's right to prepayment, that
"the creditor is an individual and not a lending institution").
Mallory Velten, Comment, Debtors As Predators: The Proper Interpretadon of "A Statement
Respecng the Debtor's . . FinandalCondidon" in 11 U.S.C. ff 523(a)(2)(A) and (B), 30 EMORY
BANKR. DEv. J. 583, 613 (2014) (discussing cases in which "the creditor is an individual-often a friend or associate of the debtor--who will suffer serious financial harm if unable
to recoup his or her loan"); see also John Finnis, Virtue and the Constitution of the UnitedStates,
69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1595, 1597 (2001) (praising those who "pay their debts, especially to
needy creditors").
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012) (imposing labeling requirements on businesses "with 20 or
more locations doing business under the same name"); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012)
(imposing payment requirement on employers with fifty or more employees); 29 U.S.C.
§ 3174(4)(D)(ii) (2012) (imposing higher costs on larger employers for publicly provided
employee training programs); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538
U.S. 440, 441-42 (2003) (discussing the exclusion of small employers from Americans
with Disabilities Act requirements); Int'l Franchise Ass'n v. Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 397 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom., Int'l Franchise Ass'n v. Seattle, 136 S. Ct. 1838 (2016)
(upholding local minimum wage requirement imposed on businesses with 500 or more
employees).
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address the needs of their consumer debtors than to meet the needs of nondebtors.138 Even large firms, however, do not have an obligation to maintain
debtors' prior economic status-though they may have a responsibility to
provide more than bare adequacy, their obligation is more plausibly
understood as a duty to fairly share the benefits of the firm-debtor
interaction, or to respond to the additional duties involved in the relationship.
Of course, unpaid debts to large firms can burden the public if these firms
pass their losses on to the public via higher prices or interest rates-but, in
markets that deviate as much from ideal assumptions as credit markets do,
there is some evidence that firms absorb their losses in part by sacrificing
profits.1 39
The case for generous exemptions at the expense of large firms becomes
stronger when we consider the political problems other proposals face. The
ideal system for providing economic sufficiency and freedom-widely
accepted among both mainstream economists and many theorists of
distributive justice-is a tax-and-transfer system, such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit or various basic income proposals.14 0 A legal rule that transfers
resources directly from some private parties to others is seen as a suboptimal
alternative.141 However, where a tax-and-transfer system is underfunded or
unavailable, a pro-debtor bankruptcy policy may be preferable to nothing at
all from a distributive point of view, especially if its burdens are absorbed by
138

139

140

141

Cf In re Molina, 420 BR. 825, 832-33 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009) ("The Trustee additionally
argues that chapter 13 is not intended as a welfare statute, and that if Debtor needs such
assistance for herself and her grandchild, it is the State (or some other branch of the
federal government) that should provide it. In a very real sense, she is correct; direct
financial aid does not come through the Code. On the other hand, bankruptcy 'gives to
the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he
owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.' . . . This
relief benefits, and is intended to benefit, a debtor in a very real financial manner. So even
though it is not ordinarily called 'welfare', bankruptcy relief serves a similar purpose as
financial aid. It is not a stretch therefore to look on bankruptcy as a legitimate way of
helping a debtor and her grandchild who are in economic straits.") (citation omitted).
On the effect of bankruptcy exemptions on interest rates, see Hynes, Non-Procrustean
Bankmvptg, supranote 9, at 334-39 (considering whether generous bankruptcy exemptions
for the wealthy raise the interest rates offered to poorer prospective borrowers).
Perhaps the most prominent defense of this view from a law-and-economics perspective
is Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Whj the Legal Sjstem Is Less Effident Than the Income Tax
in Re&stibudyng Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); for a review of distributive justice
arguments in favor of tax-and-transfer arrangements, see Brishen Rogers, Jusice at Work:
Minimum Wage Laws and SodalEquall, 92 TEX. L. REv. 1543, 1556-59 (2014).

But see Zachary Liscow, Note, Redudng Inequalit on the Chea: When Legal Rule Desgn Should
Incoporate Equip as Well as Efideng, 123 YALE L.J. 2478 (2014) (arguing that equityinformed legal rules are better equipped than taxes for reducing income inequality).
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wealthy corporations and shareholders rather than simply being passed on to
others.
However, even a generous bankruptcy policy whose costs fall solely on
the shoulders of large firms still involves the problem of arbitrariness toward
non-debtors.14 2 If bankruptcy law allows one person to buy a new sofa on a
credit card and then retain her sofa after bankruptcy, while her equally paid
neighbor is stuck with his hand-me-down sofa, the neighbor may legitimately
feel that the debtor has received an unjustified windfall. At the same time,
requiring the debtor to give the sofa up might provide an unjustified windfall
to the credit card company. The problem becomes more acute when debtors
and non-debtors compete for positional goods-most prominently
educational opportunities, but also goods like housing that have a fixed
supply.1 43 If a bankrupt debtor can keep her children in an excellent but
costly college at a creditor's expense, while her neighbor's children cannot
afford college at all, the generosity of bankruptcy law has harmed the
neighbor at the same time that it has helped the debtor.
What could bankruptcy law and policy do to allow poor non-debtors to
benefit as well? One possibility would be to move away from a pro-debtor
bankruptcy policy as a remedy for irresponsible lending, and toward some
sort of regulation or tax on large creditors whose proceeds are used in part to
assist non-debtors.144 Another approach would be to tax debtors on the value
of the property that exemptions allow them to retain, and assign the proceeds
of that tax to social programs that benefit non-debtors. Interestingly, even
though debt forgiveness outside of bankruptcy-for instance, via incomebased repayment or student loan forgiveness-is taxable, the income and
wealth preserved through bankruptcy exemptions are not.1 45
These strategies, however, are speculative and politically difficult. It may
be difficult to impose a new tax on debtors. And it is difficult to direct tax
proceeds toward non-debtors while ensuring that they are not used for
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Cf id. at 2501 (noting that redistribution via legal rules may "violate 'horizontal equity,' the
goal of treating similarly situated individuals in similar ways").
See generaly Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Equai, Prior/B, and Posidonal Goods, 116
ETHICS 471 (2006).
Cf The Future of Bankruptg: A Roundtable Discussion, 71 Mo. L. REV. 1079, 1091 (2006)
("Ronald Mann has recently been doing some writing on ways perhaps to structure a tax
on creditors who lend to debtors when it is already clear at some level that the debtors
likely might not be able to repay that debt.").
See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (2012) (excluding discharge of indebtedness in bankruptcy
from taxable income); cf Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Csis: Modficaion of
Mortgages in Bankruptg, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 565, 624 n.207 (2009) (discussing disparate
treatment of discharged mortgage debt inside and outside bankruptcy).
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entirely different purposes. Ultimately, we may be forced to choose between
achieving fairness between debtor households and creditor firms and fairness
between debtors and non-debtor households.
D. Bankruptcy Law Without Status Maintenance
The goals of economic sufficiency, freedom, and equality do not
exhaustively determine the details of bankruptcy policy. Substantial play in
the joints remains for courts and policymakers to work out. However, the
arguments offered so far support several general principles whose adoption
would move bankruptcy law beyond its focus on status maintenance.
*

*
*

*
*

Exemptions should be determined with reference to societally
accepted standards of adequacy, without reference to debtors' past
economic circumstances.
Exemptions should take a lump-sum form rather than listing a set of
goods that debtors may retain.
Exemptions should be more difficult to obtain when debts are owed
to poor private creditors or to government and charitable
institutions.
Bankruptcy policy should incorporate penalties for creditors who are
irresponsible lenders.
Property and income retained through exemptions should be subject
to a tax or other levy whose proceeds are used to fund universal
safety-net programs that assist debtors and non-debtors alike.
CONCLUSION

I have argued for reorienting bankruptcy law away from the maintenance
of debtors' status and toward the goals of fairness to non-debtors and
adequacy and freedom for debtors. To the extent these goals are persuasive,
they call for different things from different actors in the bankruptcy system.
State and federal legislators might reform bankruptcy law to provide for a
single uniform exemption, while judges and trustees might employ their
discretion to challenge claims to status maintenance while permitting debtors
to assert claims to adequacy.
Reorganizing bankruptcy law in this way not only makes it fairer, but also
harmonizes it better with other social programs and societal commitments.
Bankruptcy law developed before many of today's social programs existed at
all. Many of the state-law exemptions at issue refer to goods that are no
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longer essential today. It is time to integrate bankruptcy law more effectively
into the social safety net and, in so doing, to smooth out the places where it
offers debtors unjustified largesse. A bankruptcy system that promotes
economic sufficiency and freedom without maintaining status can relieve
pressures on the social safety net while ensuring that debtors and non-debtors
are both treated fairly. Such a system would be fairer, better, and truer to
bankruptcy's status as a creature of equity.

